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Abstract 
This study examines the effect covered bonds have on the senior bondholders. We discuss 
how this new funding method is affecting the banks' balances and to which extent the senior 
bonds credit spread is influenced by different factors. 
The results show that the senior bondholders and depositors are experiencing a much higher 
level of risk towards corporate loans than before the transfer of mortgages. This new risk is 
reflected in the increased credit spread for senior bonds. As banks continue to transfer more 
of their mortgages, so does the risk continue to increase. Our analysis of the senior bond 
credit spread shows that the return of equity (ROE) has a significant effect on the credit 
spread. We have found no evidence that size has an effect on the credit spread. 
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2. Introduction 
2.1 Research Topic 
We wish to study how the parent banks’ balance sheet composition has changed since the 
introduction of covered bond companies and how it has affected owners of senior unsecured 
bonds. We also wish to analyse to what extent the financial markets is disciplining the banks 
which have encumbered their assets, and how they are disciplining the banks with respect to 
the remaining composition of the balance in the parent bank. 
The research topic we wish to study in this paper is: 
“High encumbrance in banks – To what extent has the risk for senior unsecured bond holders 
changed with respect to the introduction of covered bond companies? And do investors in 
senior unsecured bonds discipline their banks with respect to encumbrance and the new 
composition of the balance sheet?” 
We wish to study the rate of encumbrance in the banks and the quality of the remaining assets. 
Further we want our analysis to include how the quality of the remaining assets is affected in 
the credit spreads of senior unsecured bonds. We will discuss the price changes of senior 
unsecured financing with respect to capital structure theory. We also want to look at the 
difference between senior unsecured bonds and covered bonds, and with regard to the 
differences discuss pros and cons for issuing covered bonds. To some extent we also want to 
analyse how establishing covered bond companies and issuing covered bonds have affected 
the overall pricing of bank funding and how this relates to basic capital structure theory.  
Since covered bonds were introduced in Norway in mid-2007, many changes and events have 
occurred in the financial markets. Among the largest changes is the introduction of a new 
financial regulatory framework, Basel III. This framework contains new regulations which 
may affect both the banks and investors behaviour. Another of the largest events is the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009, and later on the euro crisis of 2011. 
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2.2 How the research is conducted 
The research topic is approached with both quantitative and qualitative methods during the 
different steps of the research. 
The first step in this research is to obtain quantitative information about the balance sheets, 
capital structure and risk profiles of the six banks included in this study. The main source for 
this information is the bank’s respective annual and quarterly financial reports. When 
searching for information about a bank’s risk profile we have used the banks pillar 3 
documents in addition to the annual reports as sources. The information obtained are structured 
in time series, and these series will be basis for the quantitative research later in the study. The 
next step is to obtain prices of senior unsecured bonds and covered bonds from the financial 
markets. Since covered bonds were introduced in 2007 the time series obtained will be 
thereafter.  
We do a panel-data regression analysis to study if the increased encumbrance and changes of 
the balance sheet has affected the market prices of senior unsecured bonds. Since the 
introduction of covered bonds in 2007, banks have experienced severe financial turmoil and 
changes in regulatory frameworks. We will need to adjust for this in our research and discuss 
our findings in relation to this.  
We will also discuss our findings related to other factors that may have affected the findings 
in our analysis. Investor preferences, regulatory changes and political changes are among the 
factors that will be discussed. We will use analysis and commentary from different participants 
in the bank market as a source for criticism to our analysis. The relatively short history of 
covered bonds limits our analyses.  Therefore we will emphasize on the discussion of our 
findings. 
At the end we will discuss the future of senior unsecured bonds and covered bonds. We will 
highlight the factors that will play an important role of the future senior unsecured bond. We 
will also shortly discuss some future scenarios. 
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2.3 Research limits 
This research touches many different subjects. In the financial markets, countless factors apply 
to the movements in market prices. Changes in financial, systemically, political and regulatory 
factors affects both the quality of one bank and the markets risk-appetite. To include these 
factors would be time consuming and complex. There is no right or wrong when estimating 
the credit spreads. We have therefore chosen to emphasize on the changes happening in the 
balance sheets of the banks and how that affects the risk profile for a senior unsecured bond 
holder. We will focus less on the pricing of bonds and the pricing of the different layers in the 
capital structure.  
We have also limited our study to look at covered bonds and senior unsecured bonds. We will 
to some extent look at depositors risk since depositor holders with deposits greater than two 
million NOK have the same priority as senior unsecured bond holders in case of default. We 
have chosen not to look at the position of subordinated debt and equity holders. 
We will go through the new regulatory framework and discuss how it may affect the 
composition of a bank’s capital structure. However, we will not go deeply into the basis of the 
framework, and the foundation it is built on. 
We also limit our research with regard to credit rating agencies. Credit rating agencies play an 
important role on the price of a bank’s funding, whether it is the rating outlook on the economy 
or on a respective bank. However, to limit the scope of this assignment we choose not to focus 
heavily on changes in the credit rating.  
2.4 Methodology 
In this thesis we will conduct a case study on the establishment of covered bond companies 
and the increased use of them. The reason for why we choose to call this a case study is because 
we consider the establishment of covered bond companies and covered bonds to be an one-
time event. When a bank encumbrance its assets it finally reaches a limit where it for several 
reasons not will be able to encumbrance more. We wish to study the case of increased 
encumbrance and compare the situation for senior unsecured bondholders before and after the 
encumbrance of assets. 
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A case study is considered to be a qualitative method. We collect documents and data that 
relates to our theme. However, the analysis also include simpler quantitative approaches, like 
regression and comparison analysis to analyse the effect of encumbrance. 
The advantage of this method is that it gives us a granular understanding of this respective 
case. One of the disadvantages is that it is hard to generalize our findings. One cannot draw 
conclusions from this study over to similar cases in other business sectors or countries without 
adjusting for several factors (Gripsrud, Olsson & Silkoset, 2010). 
2.5 Sources 
Our primary source of information is the annual and quarterly reports provided from the banks. 
We also use their provided pillar three documents. First of all, these documents and reports 
provides us with the necessary data for our analysis. Second, they provide valuable 
information about the risks in banks, and how the risk is measured. 
The Norwegian bond market is not very transparent and accurate market prices of funding has 
proved to be challenging to get. However, investment banks and brokerages have provided us 
with prices of funding that are representative for our sample of banks. 
When finding information about the risk in banks and a bank’s capital structure, the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) Basel Committee papers have been useful source. We have 
also used documents and papers from different central banks as frequent sources.  
We have also found the public correspondence between the Norwegian Financial Supervisory 
Authority (FSA), the Central Bank of Norway and the Ministry of Finance as useful sources. 
2.6 Structure of the paper 
In the first part of this thesis we assemble a theoretical framework for basic capital structure 
theory. The next part is about the balance sheet for a bank, and more about why managing the 
balance sheet is most important part of a banks operation. We provide detailed information on 
the risks in banks, how they are measured and what we know about them. We’ll also provide 
a short introduction to regulations. 
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In the third part we’ll document the introduction of covered bond companies, and how they 
are established and related. We give a granular view of the foundation of these companies and 
reasons why they were established. 
In the fourth part we discuss theoretically how the risk has changed for senior unsecured bond 
holders. We shows how the bank’s balance sheets have changed as a result of this 
In the last part, which contains the analysis and discussion, we compare our theory with what 
has happened in the reality and we discuss the findings in our thesis. 
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3. Part 1: Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Capital Structure theory 
A firm’s capital structure tells us how a firm finances itself and its operations. Simply put it is 
the right hand side of the balance sheet. The two main categories of the capital structure are 
equity and debt. We could also introduce hybrid capital. Hybrid capital is an element 
combinding debt and equity.  An example is convertible debt which is debt that will convert 
to equity if the firm reaches a certain value (Myers, 1999). 
When analysing a firm’s capital structure the most common thing review is the debt-equity 
ratio and the different types of debt a firm holds. It’s common to separate between long term 
and short term debt, and between the different layers of debt. Some debt might have collateral, 
and will therefore require a lower interest rate than corresponding debt without collateral.   
How a company chooses to finance itself depends on many factors. What line of business the 
company is in, what strategy it has and the price for different types of capital. Firms with low 
credibility often has several layers of capital and uses some of their assets as collateral for 
specific loans. Firms with high credibility often use fewer layers (Rauh and Sufi, 2010). 
A firm has to pay a certain market price for the capital it holds. Equity holders will demand a 
certain return on their equity. This could either be paid out as dividends or as an increase in 
the firm value. Debt holders will demand interest on debt they provide. The sum of the return 
demanded from equity holders and debt holders is called the cost of capital (Berk and 
DeMarzo, 2011).  
Following in this chapter we will look at different theories regarding the capital structure and 
the cost of capital. 
3.2 The Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
Modigliani and Merton Miller developed their model in 1958. The Modigliani-Miller theorem 
(M&M) is important part in modern finance theory and it has had a great influence in both 
financial research and practise. The theorem is built on two propositions and concerns a firm’s 
capital structure and its cost of capital. Under the given assumptions the theorem states that 
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the firm value is not affected by the capital. The cost of capital for a firm will be equal for all 
debt-equity ratios (Myers, 2002). 
The theorem is built on a number of assumptions for the M&M-theorem to hold. These 
assumptions could be summarized as perfect capital markets, rational investors and neutral 
taxes for firms/investors and debt/equity. Put more precisely the assumptions are as following 
(Berk and DeMarzo, 2011): 
1. Investors must be able to trade firm’s different securities at market prices which are 
equal to the present value of their future cash flows.  
2. Symmetric access to finance markets. This means that investors and firms can 
borrow and lend at the same rate. 
3. Capital markets are frictionless. This means that both debt and equity can be bought 
or sold instant and without any form of cost and spread. There are also no issuance 
costs for firms issuing debt or equity. 
4. There are no taxes, or completely neutral taxes for both debt and equity among 
investors and firms.  
5. There are no agency costs. The firm will always do what is best for the owners. 
6.  No costs related to bankruptcy. 
7. A firms financing decisions does not change the future cash flow, and it does not 
reveal any new information about the firm.  
8. An underlying assumption is how a firm handles excess cash. The excess cash will 
either be reinvested in a positive NPV project or be paid out as dividends. The cash 
will not be held in the firm or invested in negative NPV projects. 
9. Asymmetric information. Both firms and investors always have the same 
information. 
These assumptions are all relevant. At the beginning M&M also assumed that all firms needed 
to be a part of the same risk class, but Joseph Stiglitz discussed this in a paper from 1969. He 
argues that if several firms in the same risk class had the same value they would all be 
maximize the value and hence be in market equilibrium. It would not necessarily be an 
evidence of the M&M theorem (Stiglitz, 1969). 
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3.3 Trade off theory 
From the Modigliani Miller theorem with taxes a firm would prefer to be 100 % financed with 
debt to maximize its value and minimize its cost of capital. This happens under the 
assumptions of perfect capital markets and no bankruptcy costs. In reality being a 100 % debt 
financed is difficult and would probably lead the firm in to financial distress. The trade-off 
theory argues that a firm would have an optimal capital structure at the highest possible 
leverage ratio, but still without letting the cost of financial distress getting higher than the 
benefits from the tax shield.  
Financial distress occurs when a firm is close to defaulting on its obligations. When a firm 
goes bankrupt the debt holders takes ownership over the firm from its equity holders. In perfect 
capital markets this has no cost, but in reality the costs related to bankruptcy is significant to 
the firms’ debt-holders. These costs can be divided in two parts. The first is the direct costs of 
a bankruptcy which is the costs related to the technicalities of a firm going bankrupt. Examples 
of this could be costs related to lawyers, bankers and other administrative fees related 
exchanging the debt owners to equity holders. The second one is the indirect costs. These costs 
are not directly related to the bankruptcy and might even occur before the company has gone 
bankrupt. An example of this is the loss of customers, reputation and employees.  
In most situations there are in debt holders interest to not let the firm go bankrupt. Stewart C. 
Myers discusses this in a paper from 1984. He argues that the debt holders will take into 
account the costs of a bankruptcy demanding higher returns. A higher level of leverage will 
increase the chance of bankruptcy and will therefore increase the costs of debt. 
The trade of theory combines the benefits a firm receives from its tax breaks on debt with the 
cost of financial distress. An increase in the leverage ratio will increase the tax benefits a 
company receives, but at a certain point, it will lead to financial distress which will increase 
the cost of debt.  There are two main factors that determine the cost of financial distress. The 
first one is the probability of a bankruptcy. The second one is the costs that occur if the firm 
goes bankrupt. 
The Trade of theory’s valuation of a firm is based on Modigliani-Millers second proposition 
with taxes. This model implies that a firm reaches its capital structure with a 100 % debt 
financing. The Trade of theory adds the present value of financial distress into this equation. 
The firm value according to the Trade of Theory would then be: 
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Formula 1 Value of a leveraged firm 
𝑉𝐿 = 𝑉𝑈 + 𝑃𝑉(𝑇𝑆) − 𝑃𝑉(𝐹𝐷) 
𝑃𝑉(𝐹𝐷) = 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠  
The firm will increase its value by adding leverage and increasing the value of its tax shield. 
But the present value of financial distress will also increase as the firm increases its leverage 
ratio. At a certain level the negative present value of financial distress will exceed the value 
of it’s the tax shield, ∆𝑃𝑉(𝑇𝑆) < ∆𝑃𝑉(𝐹𝐷),   and the firm will lose value when adding debt. 
The optimal capital structure will be reached at the point where adding extra leverage would 
increase the cost of financial distress more than the benefits from the tax shield. This point 
would be at ∆𝑃𝑉(𝑇𝑆) = ∆𝑃𝑉(𝐹𝐷).   The present value of financial distress will be inelastic 
at low levels of leverage. But as the leverage increases the present value of financial distress 
will be more elastic and grow at a faster pace. This is shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 Trade Off Theory, Value of a levered firm (Berk and DeMarzo, 
2011). The figure shows that the firm value its highest at a debt-to-asset ratio 
around 75 %.  The value of the firm will increase as the firm decides to 
increase its leverage ratio until about 75 %, after this level the total firm value 
will start to decrease. 
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The trade-off theory is by many considered to be most popular theory to determine the optimal 
capital structure of a firm. Still, finding the optimal capital structure taking financial distress 
into account is difficult. There is no definitive optimal structure and structure will vary for 
different firms and sectors. Business cycles and financial turmoil also affects the financial 
distress. 
Agency costs should be taken into account in the trade off theory. Agency costs occur when 
there is a conflict of interest between the equity holders and the debt holders. Especially when 
the risk of financial distress is high the equity holders of the firm, which also are the owners, 
could take risks that benefits the equity holders and disadvantages the debt holders. Sometimes 
changing the capital structure by adding more debt would increase the wealth of the equity 
holders but decrease the wealth of debt holders (Megginson, 1997). 
3.4 Pecking order theory 
One important assumption of both the Modigliani-Miller theories and the Trade-off theory is 
that they assume there is no asymmetric information in the markets. Myers and Majulf (1984) 
developed a model which states that a firm’s capital structure was determined by the firms’ 
need of capital. They assume that there is no optimal capital structure.  They argue that a firm’s 
management has an asymmetric information advantage above external investors. 
In cases when this information is positive the firm will prefer to raise funds for new projects 
internally (reinvest free cash flow) because the financing raised externally would be mispriced 
(Donaldson, 1961). The external investor would have an information disadvantage and 
therefor require a higher cost for the capital it is providing to the firm than the firm is willing 
to pay. When there is asymmetric information and this “information gap” occurs it has an extra 
cost for the company. The difference between the price of equity and the price external 
investors require is called the cost of information. 
Myers and Mjaulf further argues that a firms management always has an incentive to rise new 
equity when the price for the equity is low (e.g. the share price is high). The external investors 
are aware of this and will almost at all times underbid the initial offering price. And the cost 
of equity becomes more expensive than what the firm initially was willing to pay. This 
negative effect adds to the cost of information 
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Based on this argument, Myers and Majulf (1984) ranged different sources of funding. 
Financing rose internally will be the preferred source of funding. Internally there is no 
asymmetric information and they are able to choose the funding source where the opportunity 
cost is at its lowest. The same goes for external funding. This is often debt which has high 
collateral or high seniority. Ranged after this are unsecured sources of debt and hybrids. 
Financing by issuing equity is the least desired alternative. When issuing equity the cost of 
information could be high. 
When Myers and Majulf (1984) developed this model they explained some real-world patterns 
they have observed in the financial markets. They observed that in almost every industry the 
most profitable firms have a relatively low debt ratio. This observation explains itself: For a 
company to be able to raise internal capital they have to be profitable. They also observed that 
firms which conducted leverage increasing events (like stock buy-backs) gave greater 
abnormal returns to equity investors, and that firms who conducted leverage decreasing events, 
like issuing equity, gave lower return to equity investors (Myers and Majulf, 1984). 
3.5 The Expected Loss (EL) model 
A bank uses several different approaches and models to calculate risk in a bank. To calculate 
credit risk, the risk of a default for a lender, banks most commonly use the expected loss 
model. As a bank never knows the losses it will suffer, calculating expected level of credit 
losses may be challenging. These losses are referred to as expected losses. These calculations 
are based on the probability of the losses, loss given a default and the exposure at default. 
The expected loss model is simple. Expected loss is found by multiplying the probability of 
loss multiplied with the loss given a default, and the exposure at default 
Formula 2 The expected loss model 
𝐸𝐿 = 𝑃𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝐴𝐷 ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐷 
𝐸𝐿 = Expected loss 
𝑃𝐷 = Probability of default 
𝐸𝐴𝐷 = Exposure at default 
𝐿𝐺𝐷 = Loss given default 
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Since the exposure at default is given and known by the bank the expected loss would typically 
be expressed as a percentage of the exposure at default: 
Formula 3 Expected loss (given EAD = 1) 
𝐸𝐿 = 𝑃𝐷 ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐷 
The first step in calculating the expected loss is finding the probability of default. A default 
occurs if a borrower cannot completely meet its obligations. The longer the maturity on a loan 
is, the higher are the risk for a default. Table 1 show the cumulative probability of default on 
different company ratings1 provided by Moody’s in the time period from 1920 to 2011. 
 
Table 1 The probability of defaults during the years 1920 - 2011 for all ratings 
(Moody’s, 2012) 
Loss given default is calculated from the rate of loss the lender suffers in case of default. We 
could divide the loss given default into three main areas: The loss of book value, the loss of 
interest payments and costs occurred when the loss takes place (bankruptcy costs). 
This model gives a bank an idea of the expected loss it will suffer in advance. The expected 
loss model have a close connection with the different interest rate margins on loans. The 
interest rate margin on a loan needs to be minimum the expected loss rate for a lender to reach 
a break even rate on the loan.  
                                                 
1 Ratings are based on several factors. Among these are financial solidity, economic and financial conditions in area of 
operations, etc.  
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4. Part 2: Capital structure in banks  
A bank is an institution whose main purpose is to be the intermediate between money savers 
and money borrowers. It accepts deposits from money holders and lends out to money 
borrowers. The banks play an important role in managing risk and redistributing short maturity 
funds from money holders to borrowers with profitable projects with longer maturity (Hoff, 
2011). The banks have an important task in offering efficient and safe ways of making and 
receiving payments and reducing transaction costs (Norges Bank, 2004). 
Banks are the only financial institutions who is mandatory to accept depositors from 
individuals (Meinich and Munthe, 2013). We can usually divide banks into either purely 
commercial banks or savings banks. A commercial bank is established like a corporation with 
shareholders while saving banks usually are fully owned by its own foundations. Since 1987 
savings banks have been allowed to raise quasi-equity from private investors. The savings 
banks in Norway are still partly owned by its foundations, using profits for social causes in 
the societies in which they operates. After the savings banks were allowed to raise equity from 
external investors the difference between savings banks and regular commercial banks become 
smaller. We see that many savings banks have the same operational model as a regular 
commercial bank (Norges Bank, 2004) 
In this chapter we will have an introduction to the financial system and the main 
responsibilities it has. We will look at how a bank operates and fund its operations. Further on 
we will go through some theories of the capital structure in a bank. 
4.1 The Financial system 
In addition to banks and financing corporations the financial system as a whole contains 
several different institutions. These institutions are insurance companies, investment brokers, 
investment advisors and of course the financial market. All these institutions are important 
intermediaries between money holders and money lenders. Funds money holders deposits or 
invests will give a return, by receiving interest, dividends or other kinds of return. The same 
way as borrowers of funds pay interest, commissions or return on equity on the funds they 
obtain. The flows between the different participants in the financial system are shown in figure 
2.  
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Figure 2 The Financial system (Norges Bank, 2004) 
 
The financial system is in the middle being the intermediary between holders and borrowers. 
The different financial institutions also trade with each other’s. The reason why pure 
investment brokers and advisors are on the “outside” of the financial system is that they do 
not take risk like the other parts of the system, they provide information and transaction 
services. They are an intermediary between the financial system and both lenders and 
borrowers.  Investment funds do also play an important role in the reallocation of funds, but 
they are not classified as financial institutions. 
In addition to being an intermediary between money holders and lenders the financial system 
also has several other responsibilities. 
Linking and transforming different maturities and amounts is a factor when putting 
borrowers and lenders together. The amount of money and the maturity desired mismatch 
between lenders and borrowers. A borrower usually wants larger amounts and longer maturity 
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than a single lender is willing to supply. Banks play an important role here, as many money 
lenders deposit small amounts with short maturities, while borrowers often lend at longer 
maturities and bigger amounts. The total balance sheet of a bank often has a longer maturity 
on its assets than on its funding (Hoff, 2011). 
Managing and pricing risk is an important task for the financial system. The different 
financial institutions have an essential role in evaluating different business projects and 
different borrowers. Financing profitable business projects and good business ideas access 
financing is not only important for borrowers and lenders, but also the main contributor to 
global economic growth and welfare. The financial markets also price these projects and the 
risk involved efficient and fairly (Norges Bank, 2004) 
The financial system contributes to reduce concentrated risk. An example of this is an 
insurance company insuring houses or firms. The customers pay a price to insure an object 
and it is in the insurer’s responsibility to be an intermediate between all the customers. It is 
also their responsibility to price and guarantee for the objects insured. Securitization of 
business projects and loans also contributes to reduce risk. An investor with limited funds 
available is able to diversify investments in different projects and businesses either it is in 
equity or debt investments. 
Reducing transaction costs and making an efficient and transparent market is substantial 
for the financial system. It is in the best interest for both borrowers and lenders to use limited 
funds and resources on transaction between them go easily (Norges Bank, 2004). 
The Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) of Norway is responsible for the supervision of 
the financial system. It promotes financial stability and orderly market conditions 
(Finanstilsynet, 2013). The monetary policy is decided independently of the central bank of 
Norway (Norges Bank). They also act as a settlement bank and ensure that there is a reliable 
amount of liquidity in the Norwegian bank market (Norges Bank, 2012) 
Having a functioning, rational and stable financial system is an important part of a stable and 
effective economy.  Further we will look at the banks and how the capital structure of a bank 
is composed. 
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4.2 The Bank Balance sheet 
 How a bank chooses to finance itself and how it operates is shown through its balance sheet. 
A banks balance sheet distinguishes itself from other firms. It holds a significant amount of 
loans on the asset side and deposits/funding on the equity and liability side. One important 
operation of a bank is managing their balance sheets. A bank’s main task is ensuring that the 
assets have a higher rate of return than the cost of its financing. This is called the net interest 
income and is the most important source of income for a bank (Diamond and Rajan, 1998). 
 A huge part of the balance consist of deposits and lending from clients, being an intermediary 
between money holders and the profitable projects of a moneylender (Hoff, 2011).  
Figure 3 describes a typical Banking balance for a Norwegian bank at the year end of 2011.  
 
Figure 3 Composition of a bank’s balance sheet (Hoff, 2011) 
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4.2.1 Left hand side: Assets 
A bank’s assets are often referred to “total assets”, which is an important measurement of how 
big a bank is. A banks assets is not similar to those in an industrial firm. It does not contain 
large amounts of fixed assets like machines or buildings. The fixed asset a bank holds are often 
no more than its headquarter and its inventories. The assets consist mostly of loans to clients 
and reserves it needs to hold to manage it day to day operations. The composition of the assets 
tells us a lot of the amount of risk a bank is taking and how much return we can expect from 
it. A bank’s assets are usually divided by how liquid they are but they can also be divided by 
how much risk they are associated with.  
In terms of liquidity, a bank’s assets can be divided into two parts. First we have all the liquid 
assets, these are deposits in the central bank, securities like government- bonds, certificates 
and other highly rated bonds. The illiquid assets are lending to clients and fully owned 
subsidiaries. Liquid assets are associated with lower risk than illiquid assets. They usually give 
a lower risk adjusted return than illiquid assets due to a liquidity premium.  
Liquid assets, reserves and securities 
The most liquid assets are the overnight deposits in the central bank. This is a part of a bank’s 
reserves. The banks are required to deposit a certain amount of cash to the central bank 
overnight. The reason for this requirement is that the banks must hold a minimum share of 
liquidity and be able to manage its day to day operations. The required deposits are also an 
important part of the implementation of the monetary policy. The interest paid on the deposits 
in the central bank is equal to the targeted interest rate. By doing so the central bank is able to 
hold its short term rates at a desired level. Deposits in the central bank do not affiliate with 
any risk (Bernhardsen and Kloster, 2010). 
As a bank is required to hold a certain amount of cash in the central day each day it may have 
an excess amount and some days come in short. When this occurs the financial institutions 
lend to each other in an overnight market. The rate on these deposits is calculated between the 
banks each day and is affected by the amount of liquidity in the market. The rates are 
approximately equal to the targeted rate from the central bank.  These deposits are traded each 
day and are therefore as liquid as the central bank deposits. However, they are not classified 
as reserves. These deposits are considered low risk, but as you lend to a second bank there is 
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always a risk involved that the bank is not able to honour its obligations. This is called 
counterparty risk (Goodhart, 2004).  
Among the banks liquid assets are traded securities. These securities are government bond and 
certificates which is seen as the liquid asset with highest quality and corporate or covered 
bonds rated at an AA- grade or better (BIS, 2008). 
A bank can also hold amounts of liquid securities for trading or market making purposes. 
When trading, a bank will hold securities for the sake of its expected return, and the return 
comes from taking risk. This is considered a risky operation for banks. Norwegian banks holds 
low trading positions relatively to international banks. For a bank that has a market making 
purpose the expected return will come from being both a buyer and seller of the same 
securities, and the bank will earn the spread between the buy and sell side minimizing 
searching and transaction costs. Market makers whose only purpose is to make effective 
markets tries to hold neutral positions and a low risk profile, however market making can be 
affiliated with some degree of risk. 
Illiquid assets, lending 
The majority of a bank’s assets are its lending to clients. Lending gives the largest share of 
interest income. A bank divides their lending into lending to households and lending to 
corporations. It also lends to other financial institutions. These loans do have shorter maturities 
and is a part of the liquidity management in the short term. 
Lending to households mainly consist of mortgage loans. These loans account for around one 
third of Norwegian banks assets. Mortgages loans do often have a long maturity and are quite 
illiquid. Relative to corporate lending are lending to households affiliated with low risk. Both 
the banks itself and Basel regulations consider both with a higher probability for loss, and a 
higher loss given default for corporations (Norges Bank, 2012). A reason for this is because 
most loans to households are backed by high levels of collateral due properties taken in pledge.  
Lending to corporations is more complex. These loans typically have a shorter maturity than 
lending to households. Many loans are not backed by any collateral and are therefore seen as 
more risky. Many of the loans have covenants which give the lender rights in case of events 
where the probability of default increases and the loans get more risky (GARP, 2013). 
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As financial institutions lend to each other overnight, they also deposit each other’s assets on 
maturities longer than a day. They do this by either buying certificates from each other or 
lending directly to a counterpart bank. This trading is done in the money market.  The money 
market is also open for larger industrial investors and public institutions like municipalities. 
However, the banks play the most important role in the money market and are crucial for the 
liquidity management of financial institutions (Norges Bank, 2004).  
Other assets, subsidiary ownerships 
A bank often holds other assets on its balance. These assets can be ownerships in real estate 
brokerages, leasing companies, insurance companies or other financial institutions. The value 
of these assets accounts for a small part of the total assets. 
4.2.2 Right hand side:  Liabilities and equity 
How a bank chooses to finance itself is an important part of its strategy. A bank usually holds 
a lower equity ratio compared to other industries. At year end of 2011 the six largest 
Norwegian commercial- and savings banks held an average of 5,7 % equity (Norges Bank, 
2012). It is common to divide a bank funding sources between deposits from clients and 
wholesale funding. Wholesale funding is also known as market funding, issuing securities in 
the financial market. When managing the different sources of funding one can typically divide 
between short term funding and long term funding. If a bank finances it operations with a long 
average maturity the bank will be more robust during financial turmoil. In case of financial 
turmoil market funding can be difficult possibly leading a bank to distress (FSA, 2012). 
Since the different sources of funding has different prices funding decisions directly affects 
the profitability of the bank. Having an optimal capital structure is therefore balancing costs 
and risk. Having a high level of risk could be crucial in periods with financial turmoil and 
mistrust in the banking system (Mishkin & Eakins, 2009).  
“A bank lives on credit. Till it is trusted it is nothing; and when it ceases to be trusted it returns 
to nothing”  
– Walter Bagehot (1826-77) Philanthropist, Banker and Editor of the Economist 
Figure 4 shows what constitutes the capital structure of a Norwegian commercial or savings 
bank. Further in this chapter we will look at the different sections of the balance. 
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Figure 4 Capital structure of a large Norwegian bank (Hoff, 2011) 
 
Common Equity - Equity and subordinated capital 
Equity counts for a small portion of the total capital. The share of equity in a bank has 
historically been a measurement for how solid a bank is. However, research has proven that 
other measurements are well as important measuring banks strength2 (Kuritzkes and 
Schuermann, 2008).  
Commercial banks increase equity trough issuing shares and retaining profits. A savings bank 
also raise equity trough issuing shares and retaining profits.  Savings banks have historically 
have been owned by the society which it operates in. The primary fund is the society’s share 
of ownership in a saving bank. However, if a bank is to raise equity through a share issuance 
the primary fund are unable to participate and will be diluted as an owner over time (BIS, 
2010). 
                                                 
2 In “What we know, Don’t know and cant’t know about Bank risks: A View from the Trenches” Andrew Kurtzkes and Til 
Schiermann (2008) argues that other measurements than capital levels are important in a bank.  
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Subordinated capital is debt raised through hybrid securities. These securities have the same 
characteristics as a bond and are traded in the same way. The interest rate on subordinated 
debt bond may be divided in to two components. The first component is the market rate. For 
a floating variable bond this is expressed through the short term interest rates. In Norway the 
reference rate to a short term market rate may be the 3 month NIBOR3. For a fixed coupon 
bond this is expressed through the interest swap rate4.The second component is the credit 
spread. This is an issuer specific margin required by the market for taking the risk involved in 
holding a subordinated debt (Raknerud, Vatne & Rakkestad, 2011).  
A special feature of the subordinated debt is the ability a bank has to withhold the interest 
payments without defaulting on the loan. A large share of the subordinated securities are 
perpetual, but are able to be called by the issuer at regular intervals. 
Subordinated capital could be divided into two types of capital. This is tier one and tier two 
capital. Tier one capital is subordinated to all other creditors of the bank, perpetual and could 
maximum be called after five years. The issuing bank is also allowed to cancel interest 
payments at any time with full discretion. However, market discipline will play an important 
role. If a bank chooses to withhold interest payments it will send a negative signal to the 
financial markets and in the worst case lead the bank into financial turmoil. Tier two capital is 
also subordinated to a banks general creditors and depositors, but senior to tier one capital. 
Tier two capital may have a minimum maturity or callable date after five years. A bank is not 
allowed to stop paying interest rate on tier two capital (BIS, 2011). 
Equity and subordinated capital are loss absorbing sources. In case of a default the equity 
holders will be the first to take a loss. The subordinated capital will be the second source. 
Subordinated debt would not be paid until after the senior debt holders and depositors are paid 
in full. When measuring capital levels in banks equity and subordinated capital are often added 
and referred to as the total capital adequacy. 
                                                 
3 The NIBOR – Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate – A rate Norwegian banks daily reports to the Central Bank of Norway. 
The rate is supposed to reflect what rate a named bank is willing offer to lend to other named banks in the market. This rate 
lays as an reference rate for floating rates in both interbank trading and the bond market (Norges Bank, 2009). 
4 An interest rate swap is a financial contract where two parties decide to exchange interest rate payments for a fixed maturity. 
One side party pays a fixed rate, the other party pays a floating rate. The fixed rate is the reference rate for given maturities. 
These contracts are traded daily and reflects  what rates the market requires for fixed maturities at any time. 
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Equity and subordinated capital are the most expensive sources of capital. A bank will 
therefore weigh the cost of equity and subordinated capital against the safety it provides for 
the credit holders. Given a constant result higher ratio of equity will lower the rate of return 
on the equity but it will provide a lower risk (Mishkin & Eakins, 2009).  
Market financing - Senior unsecured bonds 
Market financing has over the past years become an important source of financing for 
Norwegian banks. The banks total assets have grown faster than the deposits which have led 
to an increased use of alternative sources of funding. As shown in figure 6, the market 
financing as a share of total financing has risen over the last 30 years. The maturity of market 
financing can vary from one day to several years. However, most market financing have a 
fixed maturity and does therefore give predictability in managing the capital structure (Norges 
Bank, 2012). 
 
Figure 5 The different types of funding for Norwegian banks 2004 - 2012 
(Balterzen, 2013) 
When a bank provides loans to households and corporations the marginal funding sources are 
often funds raised in the capital markets. As a bank experiences a rise in demand of loans it 
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difficult to attract new depositors over a short period. To cover the higher demand a bank will 
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therefore raise funds through the financial markets. This leads to a correlation between share 
of a bank’s market funding and the demand for loans (Raknerud, Vatne & Rakkestad, 2011). 
In figure 6 this is especially shown in the period of the late 1980’s and early 1990 are where 
the Norwegian economy suffered a significant downturn and the demand for new loans where 
low. Some of the decrease in market financing is also due to nationalization of banks during 
the Norwegian bank crisis in the early 1990’s (Gram, 2011). 
 
Figure 6 Norwegian Banks Market financing as percent of total financing 
(Norges Bank, 2013) 
 
Senior unsecured bonds have historically been the main source of market funding for a bank. 
These bonds are regular bonds issued by a commercial or savings bank. The bonds are not 
backed by collateral of any kind, but have a higher seniority than subordinated capital in case 
of a default. Senior unsecured bonds are issued with either a fixed rate or a floated variable 
rate. A bank chose fixed rate or variable rate based on its risk preferences. The interest rate on 
a senior bond may, as the rate on a subordinated bond, be divided into two components. The 
first component is the market rate. The second component is the credit spread. This is an issuer 
specific margin required by the market for taking the risk involved in holding a senior 
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unsecured bond (Raknerud, Vatne and Rakkestad, 2011). As the senior secured bonds have 
seniority over subordinated bonds, the credit margin required by the market is lower. 
The maturity on senior unsecured bonds typically lasts from 3 years to 10 years, with an 
average maturity on five years. Most Norwegian issue bonds in Norwegian Kroners – NOK. 
The largest commercial banks issue bonds in currencies such as the euro, Swedish krona or 
the US dollar as well. However, in periods with substantial financial turmoil even the largest 
banks find it difficult to raise senior unsecured bonds in the financial markets (Norges Bank, 
2011). 
Figure 7 shows the average interest rates and credit spread on a Norwegian large sized rated 
savings bank. Even though the money market rate has a large impact on the rate of senior 
unsecured bonds, one can see that credit spread is affected by financial turmoil and economic 
uncertainty.  
 
Figure 7 Credit spread in Norwegian Bank, money market rate and targeted 
rate from the Central Bank (Sparebanken Vest, 2013) 
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Market financing – Covered bonds 
Since the establishment of the Norwegian covered bonds market in 2007 have covered bonds 
become an important source of market financing for banks.  A covered bond distinguishes 
itself from a senior unsecured bond by giving investors collateral in a cover pool. Norwegian 
banks are able to issue covered bond trough subsidiary covered bond companies. (Bakke and 
Rakkestad, 2010). 
The collateral that lies in a covered bond company is privately and commercially owned real 
estate. When a bank provides a mortgage loan to a customer it takes collateral in the customers’ 
real estate. The bank transfers this loan to a subsidiary owned covered bond company and gets 
cash in return. The covered bond company places the collateral in a cover pool and issues 
covered bonds which have collateral in the cover pool. Basically, a covered bond is priced the 
same way as a senior unsecured bond. The covered bond has a lower credit spread due to the 
collateral. 
In chapter four we will go deeper into covered bonds and covered bond companies. 
Market Financing - Deposits from financial institutions and short term 
deposits 
The shortest form of market financing is done in the money market. When managing short 
term liquidity both smaller and larger banks are able to attract short term deposits from other 
banks. Named banks5 are also able to issue certificates6 in the market to bring short term 
financing. These certificates can be issued in either Norwegian kroners or any other desired 
currency. The market for Norwegian kroners is often small, and if several banks are in need 
of short term liquidity at the same time they might not be able to obtain the level wanted. A 
bank could then raise Norwegian kroner by issuing a certificate, in for example, US dollars 
and then match it with a currency swap or a currency forward contract7 to acquire Norwegian 
kroners. By doing this they aquire Norwegian kroners, by using the US dollar market to raise 
                                                 
5 By “named bank” we mean the largest bank in Norway, funding internationally. 
6 Certificates are a form of short term bonds. It has a maturity from 1 month up to 12 months, and are issued and traded as 
zero-coupon bonds.  
7 Currency swaps are a traded contract between two parts to exchange two currencies at the start of a period, and then change 
them back again in the future. The interest rate difference is paid either during the contract, or at the end of it. An Forward 
contract is contract where two parts agrees of a future purchase/sale of a currency. The interest rate difference is added at the 
spot price and makes the future price. 
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them. These markets are more liquid and Norwegian named banks are seen as a safe 
counterpart in the money markets (Hoff, 2011). 
Deposits from customers 
Deposits from customers have historically been the most important source of funding for a 
bank. It is considered a safe and stable source of funding. Deposits count for 30% of a bank’s 
total funding. Usually one can divide the deposits into deposits from households and 
corporations. However, the Norwegian Banks’ Guarantee Fund divide between deposits who 
are covered by this guarantee and deposits who are not (Hoff, 2011). 
The deposit guarantee guarantees for deposits up to 2 million Norwegian kroners for each 
person and each juridical corporate in each bank. Due to this guarantee deposits up to 2 million 
Norwegian kroner are considered the most stable source of funding. Approximately 55 % of 
all deposits in Norwegian banks are covered by the deposits guarantee and are considered a 
stable source of funding even in times with substansial financial turmoil (Lie, 2011).  
Deposits over 2 million NOK’s tend to be more volatile in times with financial turmoil. During 
the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 some banks experienced volatility in these deposits. 
However, no Norwegian banks experienced dramatically reduced deposits during the financial 
turmoil. A reason for this may be that customers who had large deposits divided them in parts 
of 2 million each and placed them in several different banks. The total deposits actually 
increased during October 2008. International research shows that deposits not covered by 
deposit guarantees zx in small banks are be more volatile than larger banks. A reason for this 
is the belief that the government would do more to save a big and named bank than a small 
bank. Due to the systemic importance a big bank plays in a modern economy (Hoff, 2011). 
Deposits from large corporate and institutional client often have different terms than deposits 
from retail clients. Retail clients have fixed terms that counts for all clients. A single retail 
client’s behaviour has no interference with a banks liquidity management. Larger corporates 
and institutions have individually fixed terms on their deposits. This is due to the size of the 
deposits. If a large client wants to withdraw all it deposits in a single bank the bank might 
require a one month or one week notice due to the short term liquidity management.  
Corporate and institutional clients often have an individually fixed price and individually fixed 
maturity on their deposits. While most deposits from retail clients are on a floating rate with 
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no maturity. However, new types of retail deposits, like “Housing Saving for Young People” 
(BSU) have extended their average maturity. 
Deposits will usually be the cheapest source of funding for a bank. For depositors with deposits 
less than NOK 2 million deposits are considered a risk free investment and the required interest 
rate are therefore low. Historically the deposit rate has been below the money market rate. 
However, due to the financial turmoil and the difficulty to obtain senior bonds at an attractive 
margin, deposit rates have been well above the money market8 rates for quite a while. 
4.2.3 Different priorities in the capital structure in the case of an 
default or bankruptcy 
In this section we will shortly state which capital that are subordinated to each other in a bank’s 
capital structure given default or bankruptcy. Figure 8 shows the priority of the different 
sources of capital in the capital structure.  
 
Figure 8 Different layers of capital in case of a bankruptcy (Longsdon, 2012) 
                                                 
8 Money market rates are interbank rates reported by the banks to the Central Bank of Norway each day. They reflect the 
interest a bank is willing to lend and deposit with in an another bank. 
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Covered bonds have the highest priority in a bank’s capital structure. First of all are covered 
bonds secured by collateral and are, according to the Norwegian covered bond rules, over 
collateralized. A bank does also guarantee for the payments of covered bonds. 
The subordinated debt to covered bonds are the holders of senior unsecured debt, depositors 
with deposit over NOK 2 million and other general creditors. All these creditors will be treated 
equally in case of a bankruptcy. 
A Norwegian bank should according to the law be members of The Norwegian Banks’ 
Guarantee Fund. A bank will therefore have insurance on all deposits from The Norwegian 
Banks’ Guarantee Fund. If a bankruptcy occurs, all depositors will be refunded deposits up to 
NOK 2 million from the Guarantee Fund. The guarantee fund will thereafter search for refund 
in the bankruptcy estate and will have the same priority as the general creditors.  
The next priority in the capital structure is subordinated debt. Subordinated tier two debt have 
seniority over tier one debt.As in all o ther firms, equity is the first layer of subordinated capital 
in case of a bankruptcy, being the first to take loss given bankruptcy. 
All equity and subordinated debt make out a bank’s capital adequacy. This is the capital that 
will take a loss prior to the banks general creditors.  
4.3 Managing the balance and risk in banks 
A bank’s main responsibility is to achieve a high return on equity without taking excessive 
risk. Having a high interest rate margin, sufficient liquidity and a low risk on both the asset 
and funding side are crucial for a bank. In order to act responsibly banks are heavy regulated 
by both international and local regulatory authorities.  
4.3.1 Risk in Banks 
A bank faces several different risks both through its operations and the managing of its assets. 
Risk is typically defined as earnings volatility, or deviations from potential earnings. Increased 
volatility in earnings increases a potential for loss (Rajan, 2005). Further in this chapter 
follows an overview of the different risks a bank faces.  
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Credit risk 
Credit risk reflects the potential loss due to the failure of a borrower to meet its obligations in 
accordance with the loan terms. In other words it is the risk of a bank’s credit counterparty 
(borrower) fails to pay the interest rates or, even worse, fails to pay some of, or the entire 
principal. For a bank, credit risk will in most cases be located on the asset side, in the lending 
and long term bond holdings. As lending often is long term asset, credit will be calculated on 
a time horizon over one year or longer. (BIS, 1999). Research proves that credit risk counts 
for about half of the volatility in earnings and are therefore by far the largest risk a bank faces 
(Kuritzkes & Schuermann, 2008). 
Market Risk 
Market risk reflects the risk of potential loss due to movements in market prices or values. In 
particular this could the movements in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, equity prices and 
commodity prices. Market risk typically resides on the asset side in a bank and is associated 
with a banks trading or market making activities. However, as a bank trades different financial 
instruments they might have short positions which will be considered a liability (BIS, 2013). 
Research shows that market risk only provides about 5 % of a bank’s volatility in earnings. 
However, this will vary from each bank. Norwegian banks does not typically involve with 
trading operations in a large matter (Kuritzkes & Schuermann, 2008). 
Structural Asset and Liability Risk – Liquidity Risk 
Liquidity risk or structural asset and liability risk is the risk related to the difference in the 
maturity between the assets and liabilities. A bank will usually have longer maturities on assets 
than on its liabilities. The asset might also be illiquid, and hard to sell at any given time, while 
funding could be withdrawn shortly and easily.  Mortgage loans, for an example, tend to have 
a maturity of 20 years or even be everlasting, while deposits could be withdrawn overnight. A 
banks market funding have a longer maturity, but it is still has an original maturity of less than 
the assets. The average maturity on a senior unsecured bond issued by a Norwegian bank is 5 
years, while it on a covered bond is 6 years (Syed, 2011).  When a bank faces risk with respect 
to its structure of its assets and liabilities we could divide it into two parts. 
The first risk is the risk for lack of liquidity.  When a bank finance long term assets with shorter 
term loans they need to rely on refinancing either refinancing the short term loans, or sell the 
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assets with a low degree of loss. The assets of a bank are often illiquid and are hard to sell. 
The operation of a bank does therefore rely on a steady cash flow from generating funding 
from the financial markets. When financial turmoil occur, the investors may sell the risky 
assets and buy safer assets like treasury securities (Kuritzkes & Schuermann, 2008). Banks 
and other financial institutions stopped trading with each other.   Most banks need to trade 
with each other on frequent basis to manage its day to day obligations and access to both short 
and long term liquidity is crucial for the whole financial system. Large, named banks do this 
on a daily basis in the money market. During the financial crisis, after the fall of Lehman 
Brothers, the money markets froze. No bank was able to fund its short term obligations. There 
was no question about the price of liquidity; there was just lack of it, no one dared to lend it 
out. No matter how solid a bank was, it could not manage to rise short term funding (Hoff, 
2011).  
The other risk in connection with the liquidity and structure of assets and liabilities is the risk 
of price changes. Generally a bank has shorter duration on its financing than on its assets and 
is vulnerable in terms of price changes. If the price on short term funding rises and is not 
matched by a change in the price on long term lending, a bank would suffer a loss. A bank is 
dependent on a rising yield curve to profit from this strategy, as well as increased term 
premiums in the case of credit premiums. This risk comes to show when a bank refinances 
itself. In the aftermath of the financial crisis credit spreads reached record high levels. Banks 
would then refinance themselves with high credit premiums which, decreasing net interest 
margin, and likewise profit. However, a bank can limit its asset/liability structure risk by 
matching some of it funding and asset preferences. This risk is somewhat related to market 
risk. However, market risks are more related to a bank’s traded assets, and its trading 
operations (Kuritzkes & Schuermann, 2008). 
Kuritzkes & Schuermann (2008) shows that risks related to the structure of a bank’s assets and 
liabilities account for about one fifth of the volatility in earnings. However, when it comes to 
the lack of liquidity seen during the financial crisis, we know that tail risks9 can occur. Tail 
risks and their impacts are hard to predict and quantify. 
                                                 
9 Tail risks are risks that are not very likely to happen 
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These three risk factors are risks that occur due to the financial systems.  These risks are a 
result of a bank being both a participant and an intermediary in financial markets connecting 
money holders and lenders. Banks also faces non-financial risks which are common to all 
firms.  
Operational risk 
Operational risk relate to risk incurred by organizations internal activities. The people, systems 
and processes in an organization are vulnerable to uncommon events. The Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS) defines operational risk in the Basel II statement as risk of loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed processes, people and systems or from external events 
(BIS, 2001). The Basel committee specifically excludes reputational and strategic risk from 
its regulation framework. While the class of reputational and strategic risk can be identified, 
the consequences are hard to quantify.  However, the reputation is important, and a bank 
usually uses significant resources on its reputation and strategy. In this paper, strategic risk is 
seen as a part of the business risk. 
Legal risk does also play an important role in banking. This risk would be found both in the 
credit management and in a banks operation. Legal risk in credit management could, for an 
example include legal disagreements about collateral or loan covenants. In the operations, 
legal risk would include the risk of legal mishandling both internally and externally, against 
customers. 
Operational risk distinguishes itself from other risks because operations, if done right, won’t 
contribute to a bank’s earnings. It will only contribute negatively if done wrong. It is all about 
limiting additional costs. Research shows that operational risk counts for about ten percent of 
the volatility in a bank’s earnings (Kuritzkes & Schuermann, 2008). 
Business risk 
As a bank is an intermediary between borrowers and lenders in the financial markets it needs 
strategies and business plans to make it attractive for the participants. A bank’s business risk 
can also be called strategic risk. What overall strategy and business plan a bank chooses will 
affect the earnings and solidity of the bank. However, it is important to distinguish between 
the strategy in market, credit and liquidity management and the overall strategy a bank uses to 
attract borrowers and lenders (Kuritzkes and Schuermann, 2008). 
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Systemic risk 
Systemic risk is the risk of an error which treats the entire banking system. Typically one 
would believe that this error would be incurred by the failure of either a bank or an important 
institution. If a large bank or institution would be unable to fulfil its obligations it could affect 
other banks, and then the entire banking system. In the aftermath of the financial crisis 
systemic risk in the banking sector became a widely used phrase among politicians, bankers 
and regulators. In the recent euro debt crisis one would also speculate in the degree of risk the 
default of a entire country would represent to the global banking system (Brander, 2011). 
Systemic risk does not need to be banking specific; it could also be represented by errors in 
for example settlement systems, payments systems and clearing systems.  
4.3.2 What we know about risks in banks 
In the paper “What We Know, Don’t Know and Can’t Know about Bank Risk: A view from 
the Trenches” (2008) Andrew Kuritzkes and Til Schuermann discusses how different risks can 
be, or can’t, be identified and managed.  
They premise that risk represent a volatility in a banks potential earnings. They divide a bank’s 
risk into three categories with respect to how easy they are to identify and to quantify.  These 
three categories are known risks, unknown risks and unknowable risks. They further discus 
how manageable these risks are and whether an unknown or unknowable risks are able to be 
managed. 
A risk is known if it can be identified prior to its origin. It will be able to calculate the 
probability for the risk occurring. It will also be able to calculate the impact of the risk, and 
maximum downside risks at a high confidence level.  Known risks are easily quantified, and 
the impact of it occurring is easy to quantify. Also known risks make up the economic capital 
which is a common measurement of the amount of risk capital a financial firm must hold to 
cover the risk that is coherent with its operations and holdings. Economic capital is measured 
by determine how much capital a firm must hold to stay solvent given the historic volatility in 
its assets (FDIC, 2004).  
A risk is unknown if it can be identified prior to its origin, but it is difficult to calculate the 
probability and the impact of it. It is possible to identify the risk; however, it is difficult to 
estimate its impact. Over time unknown risks will become more “known”, as they can be 
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linked to random factors and be estimated indirectly. Examples of unknown risks are 
unquantifiable parts of operational and business risks, like reputational risk, and risks related 
to strategic mistakes.  
A risk is unknowable if it is unable to predict and to quantify prior to its origin. When a risk 
is unable to predict it will also be unable to estimate the impact of it. Examples of such risks 
are the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre.  
 
Figure 9 Risk in banks (Kuritzkes and Schuermann, 2008) 
 
 Figure 9 shows the risk in banks, and how much each risk factor contributes to the total risk. 
This data is based on Andrew Kuritzkes and Til Schuermann research from 2008. The research 
was made on over 300 large, medium and small sized American banks. If applying these 
numbers on other bank markets one should take into account eventual differences in 
operations. For an example Norwegian banks do engage less with proprietary trading10 than 
large US banks. 
In this research, systemic risk is not taken into account. Systemic risk plays an important role 
in the total risk of the bank market and will eventually affect individual banks. It is impossible 
to quantify both the probability and impact of systemic risks with high confidence. The risk 
will also be mutual. As systemic risks can affect individual banks, systemic risks can be 
triggered by an individual bank.  
                                                 
10 Proprietary trading is when a bank trades for its own account. The return of the trading directly affects the profit/loss of a 
bank. 
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The knowledge of risks in a bank increases with the ability to quantify it. When quantifying 
risk it is important to find an estimate of both the probability of it occurring, and the impact a 
risk will have. The knowledge of risk also increases as it is disaggregated and the knowledge 
increases down to more granular levels.  
4.3.3 Summing up risks 
Market risk is by far the most known risk. It is possible to disaggregate and quantify with a 
high confidence level. Less is known about credit risk. Even though that it is identifiable the 
low frequency of default rates makes it difficult to estimate the loss given default and the total 
impact with a high confidence. Liquidity risk is also identifiable; however, a low frequency of 
losses due to illiquidity provides an insufficient data set when calculating both the probability 
and the impact of it (Kuritzkes and Schuermann, 2008). 
4.4 Capital Structure and Regulations 
In order to secure financial stability strict regulation of banks are necessary. Banks play a 
substantial role in the financial system. As banks and other financial institutions constantly 
trade with each other turmoil among banks, or even a single bankruptcy, could be critical to 
the system. This could affect both the price and availability of credit for banks which in turn 
will affect the availability and price of credit towards the society (BIS, 2011).    
During the financial crisis in 2007 – 2009 we saw how turmoil in the banking system effect 
economy and people’s welfare. During the crisis not only low capitalized and distressed banks, 
but all banks found limited sources of funding which in turn led to a severe downturn in 
economic growth (Miles, Yang and Marcheggiano, 2011).  
As a result, banks are regulated in a way to reduce excessive risk and to make them stay solvent 
in times of severe market turmoil. The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) which has 
formed the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel) has put together a global 
regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems. These frameworks are 
referred to as Basel I, II or III11, where Basel II is the current framework. However, these 
                                                 
11 Basel I, II or III symbols different releases of the Basel framework. Basel I was implemented in 1988. Basel II was 
implemented in 2003. Basel III was first drafted in 2010 and later rewised.  
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frameworks represents recommended regulations and are required by law. The European 
commission implemented the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) which is based on the 
Basel Committees recommendations, affecting also Norway through the EEA agreement. 
Local regulators and governing departments are responsible for implementing these 
regulations.  
Basel II is about to be replaced by Basel III. Basel III builds on the framework of Basel II and 
introduces enhanced and more complex rules for capital requirements, liquidity and 
transparency to the markets. The work on Basel III started in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis and will be phased inn trough CRD IV from 2015. Norwegian regulators imply that it 
will be phased in gradually and will be fully implemented by 2021. However, some of the 
requirements have already been phased in and banks are already adjusting for the new rules. 
Banks are mainly regulated through capital requirements which are closely related to the 
amount of risk they are taking, and liquidity requirements. Regulations also require banks to 
provide a certain transparency of the quality of its assets through improved disclosure.  
The Basel II and III framework is divided into three pillars. The first pillar deals with minimum 
capital and liquidity requirements towards credit risk, operational risk and market risk. The 
second pillar deals with the supervisory review process. The third pillar deals with improved 
market discipline by improved disclosure and transparency of the banks. In this chapter we 
will discuss these pillars more detailed. We will put a greater emphasis on the first pillar since 
this relates closer to our study. 
4.4.1 Pillar I 
 Capital requirements 
A bank is required to hold a certain level of capital depending on its assets and operations. 
Since different banks have different risk profiles on its assets and operations is it necessary for 
individually calculations. This is done by weighting the different assets and with regard to the 
risks involved. The result of this becomes risk-weighted assets which are used when 
calculating capital levels. Banks operations may also contain risk which will charge capital. 
This is called risk-weighted off-balance.  
When calculating capital levels a bank will not include just equity in its definition of capital.  
They are also to some extent allowed to include layers of hybrid capital. As a result of this, 
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calculating a bank’s capital ratios are far more cluttered than in a regular firm. A regular firm 
would simply divide its share of equity on the total value of its balance: 
Formula 4 Equity ratio 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
In a risk-weighted balance the total assets will be exchanged with a risk-weighted calculation 
which is based on the credit risk, operational risk and market risk. For credit risk, assets will 
are calculated weights using an expected loss (EL) model taking into account the probability 
of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), exposure given default (EAD) and for commercial 
loans maturity (M). Banks could either use an internal rating based (IRB) where they calculate 
risk weights themselves, or an standard approach where risk weights are given based on the 
type of lender.  
The total risk weights are derived using the volatility and frequency of the losses to all lenders. 
Regulatory capital are calculated on a basis that the regulatory minimum capital will cover all 
expected and unexpected losses in 99,9 % of all events. 
For an example, a loan with a risk weight of 30 % requires a bank to hold 30 % of minimum 
required capital level against the loan. If the minimum required capital level is 8 per cent and 
the lending amount is one million the banks would hold: 1 mNOK* 30 % * 8 % = 24 000 
NOK in common equity.  
Market risks are the easiest quantified risks. As a base, banks use value at risk (VaR) models 
when calculating this risk. They could either choose to use a standardized approach, or a 
internal approach.  When using internal models, these have to be approved by regulating 
authorities.  
For operational risks, which are more difficult to quantify, less accurate models are used. 
The Basic Indicator approach is the simplest way to calculate operational risk. The capital 
charged is 15 % of the three year average gross income. Years with negative or zero income 
are excluded. The standardized approach targets smaller banks, and requires them to hold 
different percentages of capital against different operational business lines. These lines could 
for an example be business and settlements services. The Advanced measurement approach 
(AMA) allows bank to use own models to calculate their operational risk.  
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A risk-weighted balance will look different from a weighted one. Mortgages will typically 
have a lower value in a weighted balance since they historically have had low default rates, 
and will require less capital. Capital adequacy levels are all calculated on a group level 
including subsidiary companies the bank has ownerships in. 
Different capital levels are divided into the capitals loss-absorbing capacity. Common equity 
is the first loss absorbing layer. 
Formula 5 Common equity 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒+𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓𝑓−𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
=  
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
  
The next layer of loss absorbing capital is lower tier one bonds. Lower tier one capital and 
equity divided by the risk-weighted assets constitutes the core capital adequacy: 
Formula 6 Core capital 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 =
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦+𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑛𝑒
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
     
The next layer of loss absorbing capital is the tier two capital. 
Formula 7 Subordinated capital 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 =
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦+𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑛𝑒+𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑤𝑜
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
    
Basel III has the following minimum requirements for a bank. As in Basel II a Bank is required 
to hold a minimum of 8 % of capital on its risk-weighted balance. This could be reached by 
using minimum 4,5 % common equity, 1,5 % hybrid capital and 2 % additional capital. 
However, the framework holds a new set of capital buffer requirements which are bank and 
cyclical specific.  
These new capital requirements will not be counted as minimum requirements. However, if a 
bank breaches these requirements regulators have the ability to put restriction on how a bank 
should allocate their profit. In other words, both dividends and bonuses would be limited.  
The first one is a capital conservation buffer of 2,5 % that should be fully reached by 2019. 
In periods with little or none financial turmoil banks should hold this buffer of capital above 
the regulatory minimum. If a bank breaches with this requirement it should try to retain inside 
capital or rise outside capital. 
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The second buffer is a System buffer which will be on 3 %. This buffer will be required for 
banks which are of a certain size and will make up a severe risk to the system if it comes under 
stress, or even worse, fails to meet its obligations. 
The third buffer is for Systemic important banks. This buffer will only count for banks that 
are important for the banking system. Local regulators will decide which banks that will be 
covered by this requirement. The buffer may be as high as 2 %.  
The fourth buffer is a countercyclical buffer. In economic downturns, distressed and 
destabilized banks may contribute to an even worse downturn. Excessive credit growth prior 
to an economic downturn may also increase the total system risk among the financial 
institutions. Local regulators can therefore put in place a countercyclical buffer when 
macroeconomic conditions points to this. The countercyclical buffer may be as high as 2,5 % 
and will be released when system risk dissipates.  
All these new capital buffer requirements must be met with common equity. When all the 
buffers are implemented the requirement of common equity will be 14,5 %, for core capital 
will it be 16,5 % and for subordinated capital 18 %. This is shown in figure 10.
 
Figure 10 Capital requirements under fully implemented Basel III. Red is 
common equity, grey is hybrid capital and blue is subordinated capital 
(Christensen, 2013) 
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Liquidity requirements 
In Basel III there are introduced two new liquidity requirements. The objective of these 
indicators is to strengthen the banks and the banking sector in case of severe financial distress 
and turmoil. This will reduce the spill-over effects from the banking sector to other parts of 
the economy.  There are developed two indicators that will be the minimum standards for 
liquidity. This is the Liquid coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NFSR). 
LCR is developed to ensure that banks have a short term sustainable liquidity capacity. This 
is done through a requirement that a bank has an adequate stock of liquid assets of high quality 
assets that ensures that the bank will tolerate severe financial distress over 30 days. These 
assets need to not be pledged as collateral. The LCR requirement is based on this equation: 
Formula 8 Liquid Coverage Ratio 
𝐿𝐶𝑅 =
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 
≥ 100 %     
The liquid stock of assets will be weighted after how high quality they have. Cash, government 
bonds and covered bonds and corporate bonds with an AAA12 rating will give a 100 % weight. 
Senior unsecured corporate and bank bonds will give a lower weight and stocks will have the 
lowest weight. 
The various posts included in the net outflow are weighted by the expected outflow in case of 
severe financial distress (“bank run”).  Time contracted deposits will have the lowest weight. 
Deposits that are covered by the government deposit guarantee do have a low weight. Deposits 
from financial actors have the highest weight. There is a high probability that these deposits 
will vanish in case of financial distress. 
The NSFR is developed to ensure a long-term sustainability of a bank’s funding program 
through requirements that a bank has a balanced maturity structure of its assets and liabilities. 
The time horizon is one year. NFSR sets the minimum amount of stable funding a bank must 
hold based on the asset composition and maturity. Simplified NSFR is a weighted fraction of 
a banks’ balance sheet where liabilities are divided by assets. 
                                                 
12 AAA rating given from one of the large rating agencies, which contain Moody’s, S&P and Fitch.  
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Formula 9 Net Stable Funding Ratio 
𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 =
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑁𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔
≥ 100 % 
4.4.2 Pillar II 
Supervisory review process 
As the first pillar focuses on a banks holdings and operations the second pillar focuses on the 
supervisory process of a bank’s complete risk. When a bank increases both its size and risk it 
should not only focus on maintaining the required amount of capital, but also further develop 
their internal risk management and risk monitoring techniques. 
Pillar II also deals with risks that are hard to quantify and not captured in the pillar one 
framework. This could be credit concentration risk – the risk of not diversifying. It could also 
be risks that are hard to quantify, like strategic risks, business risks and systemic risks. The 
second pillar will try to evaluate the bank’s capital adequacy compared to its complete risk 
profile. 
Banks are required to implement an Internal Capital Adequacy process, also known as ICAAP. 
This process undertakes the making of, and implementing of a risk-management framework 
for the bank. The ICAAP framework ensures that a bank holds enough capital to meet its 
requirements and that it manages the risk not captured under the first pillar. The ICAAP report 
will be submitted to local regulators for review and approval.  
If the report show weaknesses in a bank’s risk-management or high risks which are not covered 
in the first pillar it has the ability to require that the bank holds a higher level of regulatory 
capital than the minimum levels (Moody’s, 2012). 
4.4.3 Pillar III 
Disclosure and Market Discipline 
The third pillar focuses on a banks transparency and the market discipline arising from this. 
As a complement to the first two pillars it focuses on letting the market participants getting an 
insight in the bank’s risk-exposures, risk-processes and capital adequacy levels. These market 
participants could be investors, analysts, asset managers, other banks, clients etc.  
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The information given through the third pillar is more detailed than the annual and quarterly 
financial statements. If banks choose to use internal rating processes (IRB and AMA) the third 
pillar will provide a granular information about these. This way it will allow the market 
participants to compare banks with each other. 
Letting the markets get this information it encourages them to discipline the banks. For an 
example: If a bank has a high and uncontrolled risk exposure the market would discipline them 
by requiring them to hold a higher level of capital. If the bank doesn’t do this the market will 
require a higher risk premium and thereby require higher bond yields, rates on deposits etc. 
(Moody’s, 2012). 
These new rules are already affecting how banks operate (FSA, 2010). In order to meet the 
new standards of Basel III of holding on to more capital, the banks are  
 Paying out less dividend 
 Increasing their lending rates  
 Lowering their interest rates on bank deposits 
As the Norwegian InterBank Offered Rate (NIBOR) has been historical low, Norwegian banks 
has been criticized by the Minister of Finance, Sigbjørn Johnsen, for not lowering the lending 
rates. The banking industry has defended their actions by claiming that the increased capital 
is a part of the implementation of Basel III (Bjørnestad, 2013). 
4.5 The Credit Rating Agencies 
In order to issue covered bonds, the issuer is in need of two separate ratings by two different 
rating agencies. The most common used credit rating agencies are the “Big Three”: Moody’s, 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch. The rating of the bonds tells us two things:  1) the credit 
risk is and 2) how much expected loss given default is. The agencies have different approaches 
rating the bonds, hence bonds have different rating depending on which agency rating the 
bond. Even though, they all highlight three important matters of special importance in their 
reviews of the bonds (Bakke and Rakkestad, 2010): 
 Issuers credit rating 
 The quality of the assets in the cover pool and the cover pools ability to maintain a 
steady cash-flow 
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 The cover pool’s independence from the issuers other assets 
Fitch is following a three step process rating the bonds. The first step is to give issuer a credit 
rating and to find the “discontinuity factor” meaning the risk of bondholders not getting their 
payments in time if the issuer goes bankrupt. The next step is an assessment of the cover pools 
ability to pay the bondholders given different scenarios. In the final step it is assumed that the 
bond is raised and the cover pool are sold to see of the claim of the bondholders will be met. 
Before S&P set the credit rating they analyze the issuer in two different ways: First they look 
at the payment solutions for the bondholders and how well the national legislation protects the 
bondholders. This sets the floor for further rating. How many steps above the floor the rating 
will be depends on how S&P see the risk of the cover pool. For a covered bond in the highest 
category there will be a limit to the number of steps if it is not associated with any form of 
uncertainty to the cover pool, while for covered bonds in category two and three there will be 
an upper limit the number of steps. 
Moody’s credit rating process consists of two different assessments. First they find the 
probability of the issuer becoming insolvent and the strength of the cover pool. The second 
thing they consider is if the payments to the bondholders will come to the right time even if 
the issuer becomes insolvent. This is known as the “timely payment indicator”.  The higher 
the “timely payment indicator”, the higher the credit rating will be. 
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5. Part 3: Covered bonds in Norway 
The covered bonds legislation, as we know it, came into effect in June 2007. In 2001, the 
Norwegian government conducted a survey (Bakke and Rakkestad, 2010) which 
recommended securitization of banks assets by issuing bonds. The survey led to a model 
introduced in 2004. In this model several considerations were taken into account:    
- Improved competitiveness for the Norwegian finance industry by offering a long 
term and less expensive financing  
- Reducing the liquidity risk 
- Increased diversification for investors 
- Creating a market for fixed-rate loans 
- Cheaper loans to the public as a result of cheaper financing for banks 
The new model was introduced in 2007 and was highly anticipated. The new legislation had 
several differences comparing to the old one. The most important was that the credit 
institutions could now encumber the loans without an agreement with the borrower (FSA, 
2012). 
  When covered bonds was introduced in Norway it had already been existing for two hundred 
years in Germany and Denmark. In the late 17th Century Germany started issuing Pfandbriefe 
in need of an organized credit market. By the middle of the 18th Century, German mortgage 
banks started issuing Pfandbriefe in order to refinance new mortgage loans. 
5.1 The Norwegian Housing Market – A closer look at the 
underlying asset of Covered bonds 
The main reason why the Norwegian covered bonds has been received so well by the market 
is the underlying asset of covered bonds, the mortgages. The Norwegian housing market is, as 
the Norwegian economy, look upon as very stable and in good shape. Even though there has 
been speculations’ regarding that the prices may have reached its absolute maximum. The 
Statistics Norway (SSB) has concluded that the prices will grow between 5-10% until the year 
2015. Their forecast is saying that the prices will stabilize from 2015 and from then follow the 
BNP-growth of 2-4%. (SSB, 2012) 
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The Norwegian mortgage market is approximately worth NOK 1900 bn. Norway has among 
the highest percentage of home ownerships in the world, very few buy to rent out (20% of the 
mortgages). The borrowers are personal liable for their debt, also for outstanding debt post 
foreclosure and forced sales. This means that given a personal default of the borrower, then 
the borrower can’t escape the mortgage by leaving the house, which is the practice in the US. 
During the Norwegian bank-crises in the late 80’s/early 90’s the Norwegian housing market 
showed it’s resilience. Even though the banks experienced large problems due to expansive 
lending during the 80’s, they had close to no losses in residential mortgages. The Norwegian 
housing market showed the same resilience during the financial crisis in 2008 when the house 
prices fell 18 % (adjusted for inflation) during two quarters of ultimo 08 and primo 09 before 
the prices again started to rise (Eitrheim and Erlandsen, 2011) 
A stress test of Norwegian banks conducted by the Norwegian Central Bank (Norges Bank, 
NB) showed that the housing prices could fall up to 35% before the credit institutions are in 
danger of breaking the balance requirement (the value of the pool must exceed the value of 
the bonds). Since most of the mortgages has a LTV below 75%, there won’t be a proportional 
change between fall in housing prices and fall of the pool value. Further on, the NB found that 
a 10% fall in housing prices will reduce the pool by 3% and a big fall of 40% will reduce the 
pool by 23%. The sample of this test was 75% of the covered bonds issued by Norwegian 
banks (Norges Bank, 2012). 
5.2 “Bytteordningen” 
During the fall of 2008, Norwegian banks experienced large problems financing themselves. 
Since the Norwegian interbank market is not adequate enough, Norwegian banks are required 
to enter the American dollar-market by swapping USD for NOK and vice versa. When Lehman 
Brothers declared themselves bankrupt September 2008, the confidence between banks 
disappeared. This eventually made it difficult for Norwegian banks to find suitable 
counterparts for the swaps. The Norwegian Central Bank (NB) – in order to give liquidity to 
the banks - offered the banks to swap covered bonds for Norwegian government bonds. By 
selling the government bonds by auction, the banks had to specify how much they wanted, the 
length of the deal and how many basis points above a certain fixed price they were willing to 
pay.  When the deal is finished, the banks are required to buy back the covered bonds at the 
same price they were sold for.  
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  The Norwegian government bonds are looked upon as a very safe and are easy tradable. This 
swap made sure that the banks regained confidence and they could again return to the dollar-
swap market. 
This exchange between The Norwegian Central bank and the banks was essential to secure 
financing for the banks. In total, over NOK 230 bn in covered bonds was transferred to the 
Norwegian Central Bank. By spring 2014 all the covered bonds should be returned to the 
banks. The financial crises started a “flight to quality”, making triple A rated bonds very 
popular (Klovland, 2012). 
 Since the exchange proved to be very effective, more and more banks started up their own 
credit institutions. Before the exchange there was 7 credit institutions and now – in 2013 - 
after several consolidation the last years, there are a total of 23 credit institutions in Norway 
(European Covered Bond Council, 2012). 
5.3 Norwegian legislation 
Norwegian covered bonds are regulated by two laws: «Lov om finansieringsvirksomhet og 
finansinstitusjoner» from 1988 and «Forskrift om kredittforetak som utsteder obligasjoner 
med fortrinnsrett i en sikkerhetsmasse bestående av offentlige lån, utlån med pant i bolig eller 
annen fast eiendom» from 2007. These laws say that the bonds must be issued by a credit 
institution and the loans making the pool must be owned by the same credit institution. The 
loans may be transferred from the bank or given directly by the credit institution. In case of 
default, the covered bonds owner has a direct claim towards the credit institution and the 
underlying asset, the pool. The pool is a mix of mortgages and mortgages relating commercial 
property, loans to government within the EEA or OECD or derivatives were the counterparty 
has a sufficient low risk class. The mortgages must be within 75% of the total market value of 
the property and the commercial property must be within 60% of market value. Each loan can 
account for maximum 5% of the pool and maximum 15% of the pool can be directly exposed 
to banks. 20% of the pool can be collateral consisting of deposits or very safes bonds as 
government bonds. 
The value of the pool must always exceed the value of the issued bonds. The pool is valued to 
market value while the covered bonds are valued using the present value-method. Assets that 
not are within the requirements of the legislation may still be a part of the pool, but should not 
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be included calculating the balance requirement. This means that the bonds owners may – 
given default – have claim towards assets not meeting the requirements of the Loan-To-Value. 
To make sure the pools are meeting the standards, The Financial Supervisory Authority of 
Norway have order an independent committee to inspect the cover pool every three months. 
The institutions are also committed to initiate stress test ensuring that they meet the financial 
requirements of the covered bonds owners. 
If a credit institution experience difficulties securing the bonds owners their payments, the 
government may take control of the credit institution. The government will then act as the 
bankruptcy administrator together with the bond owners (Bakke and Rakkestad, 2010) 
5.4 Concentrated vs. Dispersed ownership 
Of the 23 mortgages credit institutions in Norway, 5 of them have a dispersed ownership. 
Dispersed ownership means that several banks has a joint venture, contributing assets and 
sharing risk, in opposite to concentrated ownership where there – in this case – there is one 
owner taking all the risk and contributing with all the assets.  
5.4.1 Theory of Concentrated ownership  
Ownership is regarded as an important control mechanism of the firm. Principal-Agent theory 
argues that if ownership and control is separated, the firm may lose value (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling concluded that large investors are better to protect their 
investments than several small investors, provided the large investors invests time and 
resources on disciplinary measures. Principal-Agent theory further argues that a concentrated 
group of principals (owners) reduces agent cost making concentrated ownership and payoff 
correlated. 
Concentrated ownership reduces the diversification opportunities of the owner, hence carrying 
an unnecessary large risk (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). This would imply that concentrated 
ownership isn’t common, when it’s actually the opposite making it hard to believe that the loss 
of diversification exceed the gains of having control rights in the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). 
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5.4.2 The verdict of the market  
In March of 2009, Moody’s downgraded Terra Boligkreditt AS from Aaa to Aa2. Moody’s 
explanation was simple: Due to dispersed ownership and the absence of an explicit and 
irrevocable joint and guarantee from the owner banks, Moody’s downgraded Terra 
Boligkreditt covered bonds. From Moody’s rating report (Moody’s, 2009):  
“As is the case with other covered bonds, Moody's considers the credit strength of the 
transaction to be linked to that of certain parties, in particular the Sponsor Bank. Should 
such credit strength continue to deteriorate, all other things being equal, the rating of the 
Covered Bonds might be negatively affected” 
Terra Boligkreditt is owned by 78 savings bank and one housing cooperative, OBOS (SEB, 
2011). It’s likely to believe that the investors trust the rating agencies to make sure how the 
ownerships-structure affect the safety of the covered bonds. Norges Bank, the central bank of 
Norway, is illuminating the aspects of the dispersed ownership stating that there is a legal risk 
with covered bonds. Since there has been no legal events regarding the covered bonds and 
how this will affect the banks, there is much uncertainty to be resolved. The credit agencies 
focus is whether the cover pool is separated enough from the others assets of the owner, so in 
case of default, the investors are not forced to join negotiations (Bakke and Rakkestad, 2010). 
Even so, the Norwegian legislation is very much alike the German legislation where covered 
bonds has a long history.  
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6. Part 4: Descriptive part 
In the past few years encumbrance of assets have been more frequently used among European 
banks. Among Norwegian banks the encumbrance has mainly been used throughout repo 
agreements with the Norwegian Central Bank and throughout the transfer of loans to covered 
bond companies. Mortgage loans with high quality have been transferred in to subsidiary 
owned covered bond companies. As a result of the transfer of mortgage loans the composition 
of both the asset side and funding side in the parent bank. In the banking group as a whole we 
see that the composition of funding has changed. This has changed the risk involved for 
general creditors to the parent bank.  
The Norwegian covered bond model makes the degree of encumbrance in the parent bank 
more complex. However, due to the guarantees given from the parent bank to the covered 
bond company, the result of transferring mortgage loans to a subsidiary covered bond 
company gives an equal result as if the loans where encumbered and still where on the balance. 
In this chapter we will give an economic approach to the changes that take place when a bank 
transfers it mortgage loans over to a subsidiary owned covered bond company. We will study 
how the transfer of mortgage loans takes place, how it will appear on a bank’s balance, and 
how it hypothetically will affect the situation for the general creditors in the parent bank which 
also covers the owners of senior unsecured bonds.  
6.1 The transfer of mortgage loans to covered bond 
companies 
In the Norwegian covered bond model the mortgage loans are transferred from the parent bank 
to a subsidiary owned covered bond company. The collateral which lays behind these 
mortgage loans are used in a cover pool which is used as collateral for the covered bonds 
issued by the covered bond company. This distinguishes the Norwegian banks covered bonds 
from the most of the other banks covered bonds where both the covered bonds and the assets 
remain on the balance of the parent bank. 
Furthermore, in this section, we will go through the transfer of mortgage loans from the parent 
bank to a subsidiary owned covered bond company.  We have chosen to divide the secretion 
into five steps. The first four steps describe how the mortgage loans have been transferred to 
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a covered bond company and been used as collateral to issue covered bonds. The fifth step 
describes how the parent bank might choose to use the cash it acquires from transferring the 
covered bonds to a covered bond company. The Bank faces several choices on how they could 
use the cash. Figure 11 shows the five steps figuratively (Bakke and Rakkestad, 2010) 
 
Figure 11 The Norwegian Covered Bond Model (Bakke and Rakkestad, 
2010) 
The first step is when the parent bank transfers qualified mortgage loans to 
its covered bond company. The covered bond company will then “owe” the 
parent bank for the loans it has received. The mortgage loans it receives has 
collateral in real estate. This collateral will be put in a covered pool. 
1. The covered bond company then issues covered bonds which are covered with 
collateral in the cover pool. 
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2. These bonds are sold openly on the financial market. The investors are pension 
funds, government funds, money market funds or other investors.  
3. The covered bond company then uses this money to pay back the parent bank for the 
loans that it received.  
4. After this transformation the parent bank has “sold” a share of high quality mortgage 
loans to its covered bond company and received cash. However, in the banking group 
as a whole, the loans are still on the balance. Simply said; they have been 
encumbered and used as collateral for issuing new debt, and the total amount of debt 
has gone up. How the parent bank chooses to use the cash acquired from the issue of 
covered bond is important for the development in both size and risk in the parent 
bank, and on the stakeholders in the parent bank. 
The parent bank then faces several choices on how they could dispose their cash acquired from 
the selling of the covered bonds. Further in this section we will discuss the different choices it 
faces. 
If the banking group wants to maintain its leverage ratio it will start to buy back other 
liabilities. Since the bank can’t buy out depositors, and short term debt is important for the 
liquidity management it will usually start to buy senior unsecured bonds. To maintain its 
leverage ratio it will buy the exact same amount of senior unsecured debt as it acquired from 
issuing covered bonds. In that way, the bank group as a whole has maintained its size and 
leverage ratio. Since regulatory capital is calculated on a group level this would be necessary 
for banks with limited sources of regulatory capital. 
However, if a bank has the necessary quantities of regulatory capital it has the possibility to 
use the excess cash to grow. It could use the cash to expand in activities associated with higher 
degree of risk like commercial lending or trading activities. Commercial lending and trading 
activities is compiled with a significant higher risk than lending to households. The overall 
risk of the bank will therefore rise given all else equal.  
If a bank chooses to use its excess cash to expand its liquidity portfolio by buying government 
or covered bonds with a high rating the overall risk of the bank would decline given all else 
equal. Covered bonds and government bonds with a high rating are compiled with a lower risk 
than lending to households. A bank may use the excess cash to buy covered bonds issued by 
peer banks. This would diversify the bank’s assets and therefore reduce risk the overall risk 
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given that the risk of the covered bonds holds a somewhat equal risk to the banks own covered 
bonds. 
6.2 Balance composition after the transfer of mortgage 
loans – Maintained leverage ratio 
The transfer of mortgage loans to covered bond companies will change the balance of the 
parent bank and the banking group as a whole. Further in this section we will explain these 
changes. 
Table 2 illustrates the balance of a typical larger, Norwegian, rated bank prior to the 
introduction of covered bond companies. It holds both the lending to corporation and 
households on its balance. The majority of the banks market funding is obtained by issuing 
senior unsecured bonds. 
 
Table 2 Simplified balance sheet of a fictitious Norwegian bank prior to the 
introduction of covered bonds. 
 
The bank has these typical characteristics: 
- A medium sized liquidity portfolio, 8 % 
- A higher share of lending to households than to corporations, 5/3 ratio 
- A medium deposit-to-asset ratio, 30 % 
- High share of senior unsecured debt financing, 50 % 
- A share of 10 % subordinated debt and equity. This would be the loss absorbing 
capital 
For convenience, the numbers in the banking balance is given in billions. We can assume that 
80 % of the bank’s mortgage loans (40 bn.) have sufficient amounts of collateral and does 
therefore qualify for the transfer to a covered bond company. 
Cash/Liquidity portfolio 8 Deposits 30
Loans to households 50 Market financing (senior bonds) 50
Loans to Corporations 30 Other debt 10
Other investments/assets 12 Subordinated debt and equity 10
Total Assets 100 Total Liabilities and Equity 100
Assets Liabilities and Equity
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In this example, the bank chooses to transfer all of these loans out of the parent bank, and in 
to the subsidiary owned covered bond company. 
The bank has an un-weighted capital adequacy13 of 14.93%14. Let’s assume that the bank is 
required to hold 10 % loss absorbing equity in the covered bond company to acquire the rating 
desired. Figure 15 shows the balance of the covered bond company. The covered bond 
company receives 40 bn. worth of mortgage loans which it uses as collateral to issue covered 
bonds. Due to the desired capital level of 10 % it issues covered bonds for 36 bn. Table 3 
shows the balance of the covered bond company. 
 
Table 3 Simplified balance of a covered bond company. 
Immediately after the parent bank receives cash for the secretion of mortgage bonds it has a 
large amount of cash/liquid assets available. Table 4 illustrates this.
 
Table 4 Balance of parent bank immediately after the transfer of covered 
bonds 
                                                 
13 Often known as the leverage ratio. Note this definition of the banking leverage ratio (i.e. capital/unadjusted 
assets) operates contrary 
to normal concepts of leverage, in the sense that a higher ‘leverage ratio’ means lower ‘leverage’ in an economic 
sense of debt-to-equity. 
14 For the loans to households: 50 bn * 50% = 25 bn. For the loans to corporations: 30 bn * 100% = 30 bn. Other 
investments / assets: 12 bn * 100% = 12 bn. In total: 67 bn. Equity = 10 bn. Capital adequacy ratio = 
10
67
=
14.93%. 
 
Loans to households 40 Market financing (Covered bonds) 36
Equity 4
Total Assets 40 Liability and Equity 40
Assets Liabilities and Equity
Cash/Liquidity portfolio 44 Deposits 30
Loans to households 10 Market financing (senior bonds) 50
Loans to Corporations 30 Other debt 10
Other investments/assets 12 (Off balance) guarantee for cov bonds
Ownership Cov. bond company 4 Equity 10
Total Assets 100 Total Liabilities and Equity 100
Assets Liabilities and Equity
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Originally, the risk in the parent bank has gone down. It has sold high quality mortgage loans 
with low risk, and received cash, which has no risk. The capital adequacy is at the same level 
as before.  However, capital adequacy is calculated on a group level, and the loans are still 
owned by the group. Table 5 illustrates the balance of the banking group. 
 
Table 5 Banking groups balance immediately after the transfer of covered 
bonds 
The total size and leverage ratio of the bank group has increased. The bank holds relatively 
less loss absorbing capital than before. 
If we further assume that the bank wish to maintain its leverage ratio and to hold the capital 
adequacy levels at 10 %. To do this, the parent bank will buy back senior unsecured debt. It 
will buy back 36 bn. of senior unsecured debt. Table 6 illustrates the balance of the parent 
bank with a maintained leverage ratio. 
 
Table 6 Balance of parent bank with maintained leverage ratio. 
 
In this balance we have introduced an off-balance post on the liability and equity side called 
“guarantee for covered bonds”.  The parent bank has several legal ties to the covered bond 
company. For an example, it has to guarantee for the for the covered bonds company’s 
Cash/Liquidity portfolio 44 Deposits 30
Loans to households 50 Market financing (senior bonds) 36
Loans to Corporations 30 Market financing (covered bonds) 50
Other investments/assets 12 Other debt 10
Equity 10
Total Assets 136 Total Liabilities and Equity 136
Assets Liabilities and Equity
Cash/Liquidity portfolio 8 Deposits 30
Loans to households 10 Market financing (senior bonds) 14
Loans to Corporations 30 Other debt 10
Other investments/assets 12 (Off balance) guarantee for cov bonds
Ownership Cov. bond company 4 Subordinated debt and equity 10
Total Assets 64 Total Liabilities and Equity 64
Assets Liabilities and Equity
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issuance of covered bonds. The Parent bank will also have to guarantee for the covered bond 
company to all times hold a certain amount of equity. A general creditor must take this into 
account when analysing the risk in the parent bank. 
The balance of the parent bank has increased due to its ownership in the covered bond 
company. The capital adequacy does therefore reach levels of 19,6%15. However, in the 
banking group, the balance of both the parent bank and the covered bond company is 
consolidated. Table 7 illustrates the balance of the banking group. 
 
Table 7 Banking Group balance after the introduction of covered bonds. 
The balance of the banking group does to some extent look familiar with the balance 
introduced in the beginning of this chapter. The composition of the assets is the same as before. 
The main change has occurred among the market funding of the bank. Covered bonds do now 
count for 36 % for the total funding. The covered bonds have encumbered 40 bn. of lending 
to households as collateral. These loans are the assets with the highest grade of quality.  
The remaining creditors general must adhere to the parent bank. From table 6 we observe that 
the parent bank has several new characteristics: 
- A relatively greater liquidity portfolio, 12,5 % 
- A greater deposit-to-asset ratio, 46,8 % 
                                                 
15 For the loans to households: 10 bn * 50% = 5 bn. For the loans to corporations: 30 bn * 
100% = 30 bn. Other investments / assets: 12 bn * 100% = 12 bn. The ownership in the covered 
bond company: 4 bn * 100% = 4 bn. In total: 51 bn. Equity = 10 bn. Capital adequacy ratio = 
10
51
= 19.61%. 
 
Cash/Liquidity portfolio 8 Deposits 30
Loans to households 50 Market financing (senior bonds) 36
Loans to Corporations 30 Market financing (covered bonds) 14
Other investments/assets 12 Other debt 10
Equity 10
Total Assets 100 Total Liabilities and Equity 100
Assets Liabilities and Equity
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- A decreased ratio of senior unsecured bonds as a funding source: 21,9 % 
- A major shift towards corporate lending. 75 % of all lending are now lending to 
corporates. 
- Other investments counts for a larger part of the balance, 18,8 %, this could be 
activities like proprietary trading or venture investments. 
- The share of subordinated debt and equity has risen to 15,6 % of the balance. 
However, when adjusting for the guarantee it has for the equity in the covered bond 
company. It remains at 10 %.  
- The parent bank has other guarantees for the covered bond company. This is 
considered an off-balance risk. In an risk-weighted balance this would be an 
“liability” for the parent bank. 
In the next section in this chapter we will further discuss how the risk has changed for the 
general creditors in the bank, and thereby the owners of senior unsecured bonds. 
6.3 Risk and collateral in the parent bank – What’s left for 
the senior bond holder? 
As we shown in the previous section, after the secretion of mortgage loans to a covered bond 
company, the balance of the parent bank has made a major shift away from household lending. 
The activities in the parent bank now consist in a greater degree of lending to corporations and 
other businesses. 
As we earlier have stated, holders of senior unsecured debt are exposed for credit events16 that 
would occur in the in the parent bank. The composition of the balance sheet and the activities 
in the parent bank are therefore important for the risk profile for the holders of senior 
unsecured debt. 
After the separation of mortgage loans the degree of senior unsecured bonds as a funding 
source has decreased. However, as we presented earlier, all the banks general creditors are 
equally prioritized in the case of a bankruptcy. The depositors, financial institutions, holders 
                                                 
16 A credit event occurs when the lender, in one way or another, breaches with its loan agreements. This could either be 
missing payments, like missed interest payments or missed principal payments, or breaches with other agreements that may 
be stated in the covenants. 
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of long term senior unsecured debt and short term debt owners will all be treated equally in 
the case of a bankruptcy. The only source of funding which has a lower priority is the equity 
and subordinated debt. 
We discussed and presented Kuritzkes and Schuermann (2008) research on banking risk. They 
approached risk as the deviation from potential earnings, and divided them in to what extent 
they are quantifiable (knowable). Figure 1 illustrates their findings and the percentages of 
them.  
 
Figure 12 Risks in banks given in percentages and rated after the degree of 
possibility to quantify them (Kuritzkes and Schuermann, 2008) 
 
Further in this chapter we will analyse how the risk has changed in the parent bank 
emphasising these sources of risk. 
6.3.1 Financial Risk 
After the secretion of mortgage loans the balance sheet has clearly made a major shift towards 
corporate lending and other investments. Lending to corporation is assembled with more risk 
than lending to households. When a bank lends to a household it takes collateral in the real 
estate. Historically low volatility of real estate prices and the requirements of over-
collateralization make lending to households coherent with low risk (Norges Bank, 2012). We 
could also assume that the lending to households which are left in the parent bank is of a lower 
quality than those who are transferred (Sparebanken Vest, 2013)17. Given all else equal this 
                                                 
17 In Sparebanken Vest’s Pillar three document from 2012 they states than lending to households which are not transferred to 
a covered bond company has a higher degree of expected loss, than the loans which are not. 
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would increase the credit risk for the parent bank. Credit risk is also by far the greatest source 
to risk in a bank (Kuritzkes and Schuermann, 2008). 
Banks’ other investments may contain activities which relates to market risk. In our example, 
after the secretion of mortgage loans, there is no theoretically evidence that the bank has 
increased its market risk. However, as mortgage loans are taken of the balance, activities which 
contain market risk represent a relatively greater proportion of the parent banks activities. The 
market risk has therefore increased for the parent bank. 
Regarding liquidity risk there are several factors to take into account. The parent bank has 
acquired a relatively greater liquidity portfolio by obtaining more cash. By introducing 
covered bonds it has also established additional sources to funding. This indicates a lower 
liquidity risk However, the guarantees it gives to its covered bond company might limit some 
of the benefits of establishing it. 
6.3.2 Non-Financial Risk 
Business risk and operational risk are hard to quantify and it is difficult to say if they have 
decreased and increased. However, we could with confident say that both the operational risk 
and business risk is greater in the parent bank than in the covered bond company. 
6.3.3 Increased leverage ratio 
In this chapter we have not emphasised on how risk would develop if the bank would increase 
its leverage ratio. If a bank would increase its leverage ratio the further development in risk 
would depend heavily on how they would choose to grow. 
In the next chapter we will analyse how the risk in the parent bank has changed. We will 
analyse the rate of encumbrance and the quality of the remaining assets. We will further look 
on how it has changed the price of senior unsecured debt. We will discuss our findings with 
respect to financial theory, regulations and other related phenomena in the financial markets. 
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7. Part 5: Analysis 
In this chapter we conduct an analysis of the changes in the banks’ balance sheets. We will 
look closer on the transfer of mortgage loans, the encumbrance and on the assets and risk that 
are remaining in the parent bank. We will further study how this has affected the price of 
senior unsecured debt.  
We will conduct this analysis on a representative sample of Norwegian commercial and 
savings banks. Covered bonds were not introduced in Norway prior to mid-2007. This limits 
the time frame of this analysis. However, we will introduce other variables that are not directly 
related to encumbrance and the introduction of covered bond companies in our analysis. In the 
year 2007 banks introduced new accounting principles. They were required to use the new 
principles on numbers back to 2005. The analysis is based upon the time from the fiscal year 
2006 to and including the fiscal year 2012. 
The first step in this research is to study the rate of encumbrance in our sample of banks. We 
analyse each respective banks annual statement to acquire the information about how much 
each bank is transferring to its covered bond company. The next step is to analyse the quality 
of the remaining assets in the parent bank. To find this we will use the respective banks pillar 
3 documents in addition to the annual reports. Since the banks have different ways to report 
its risk in the pillar 3 documents, we will only find a rough measure of the quality of the assets. 
Still, we are confident that this will provide a solid base for our further research.  
The next step is to analyse how the encumbrance and the quality of the remaining assets have 
affected the price of senior unsecured bonds. We will analyse the time series of senior 
unsecured prices and use a fixed-effect panel-data regression analysis to compare them with 
the degree of encumbrance and quality of remaining assets. We have found five factors we 
mean could represent changes in the banks respective balance sheets.  
The financial crisis began softly in mid-2007 when several European banks and hedge funds 
reported losses on financial products related to the American housing market and mortgage 
loans. It reached it most harsh levels in September 2008 when Leman Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy. The money market dried up, and both the equity and credit markets experienced 
severe turmoil. When the money market regained some of its confidence in mid-2009 the debt 
problems among European countries came to the surface, the euro crisis. The euro crisis has 
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in a varying extent been a source of financial turmoil since 2009. In our research we will adjust 
for financial turmoil and changes in overall market premium by using a dummy variable. 
7.1 Our research sample – Banks included in the research 
The Norwegian Bank Market has historically been dominated by saving banks. However, the 
trend is pointing in the direction of fewer and larger banks. In 1922 there were about 600 
savings banks in Norway. Today there is about 110 savings banks and 20 commercial banks.  
About 77 of the savings banks are small sized and operating under the Eika Alliance18 and 19 
banks are operating under the SpareBank 1 – Alliance (Syvertsen, 2012).   
However, the size among the banks is much skewed distributed. The largest bank is by far 
DNB ASA, which counts about NOK 2264,84 billion in total assets (including insurance). 
There is a large step down to the second largest bank is a Swedish owned commercial Bank, 
Nordea Norge ASA, with NOK 550 billion in assets. The second largest Norwegian bank is 
SpareBank 1 SR-Bank with NOK 140 billion in assets. 
We have chosen to look at a representative sample of Large and medium sized Norwegian 
Commercial and saving banks. Due to the skewed distribution of the unequal size of 
Norwegian banks and different legal frameworks in the Nordic countries we had to line up 
some criteria for the sample of the banks: 
1. Since Norwegian covered bonds were introduced in 2007, a delay on the rest of the 
Nordic countries we would only analyze fully owned Norwegian Banks. This omitted 
Swedish- and Danish banks Norwegian branches from our list. 
2. The Bank must be a significant participant in the senior unsecured debt market. It 
needed to have a certain amount of senior unsecured debt issued at all times. This 
omitted small banks from our list.  
3. The Bank needed to fully or partly own a subsidiary Covered Bond Company. 
However, the degree of ownership in the covered bond company will not matter in 
our research, when we will analyse the remaining assets in the parent bank only. 
                                                 
18 Eika is an alliance for small saving banks, earlier on known as the Terra group. 
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This left us with six Norwegian Banks: 
DNB ASA: Total Assets19: NOK 2013,4 billion, independent commercial bank. Rating parent 
Bank20: A+ Covered Bond Company: DNB Boligkreditt ASA. (AAA) 
Sparebanken Vest: Total Assets NOK 127,83 billion, independent savings bank. Rating 
parent Bank: A. Covered Bond Company: Sparebanken Vest Boligkreditt: (AAA). 
SpareBank 1 SR-Bank: Total Assets NOK 141,54 billion, Commercial Bank in Alliance. 
Rating parent Bank: A. Covered Bond Company: SpareBank 1 Boligkreditt (AAA) 
SpareBank 1 SMN: Total Assets NOK 107,92 billion. Savings bank in Alliance. Rating 
parent Bank: A. Covered Bond Company: SpareBank 1 Boligkreditt (AAA) 
SpareBank 1 SNN: Total Assets NOK 75,26 billion. Savings bank in Alliance. Rating parent 
Bank: A. Covered Bond Company: SpareBank 1 Boligkreditt (AAA) 
SpareBank 1 Hedmark: Total Assets NOK 44,11 billion. Savings bank in Alliance. Rating 
parent Bank: A. Covered Bond Company: SpareBank 1 Boligkreditt (AAA) 
DNB and Sparebanken Vest are independent banks and holds their own respective covered 
bond company. The Four “SpareBank 1” banks are in an alliance and are all part holders of 
SpareBank 1 Boligkreditt.  
The SpareBank 1 Banks have, unlike the two other banks, part-ownerships in their covered 
bond companies. They therefore do not include loans transferred into the covered bond 
company in their consolidated annual statements. However, in our analysis we will include 
the value of these loans so we would get comparable inforamtion for the banks.  
 
                                                 
19 All Total assets at year end 2012. And are given by the Banking Group.  
20 Ratings that given from either Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s. Standard and Poor’s rating scale are used. If there’s only 
given ratings from Moody’s the S&P equivalent is used.  
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7.2 Data presentation 
We have studied our respective banks annual reports and gathered information about 
development in their use of covered bonds as a funding source. We have also studied the 
quality of their remaining assets. In our data set, DNB is by far the largest bank. DNB will 
therefore be of great impact in our statics. In cases where the data from DNB or any other 
banks differs from the rest of our sample we will inform about these findings and discuss them. 
Before determining the variables in our data set we will shortly discuss some of the findings. 
7.3 Increasing use of covered bonds 
Our data shows an increased use of covered bonds since their introduction in mid-2007. DNB 
already established their covered bond company in 2005. The SpareBank 1 banks established 
their covered bond company in 2007, and Sparebanken Vest established their covered bond 
company in 2008. Figure 13 illustrates our sample banks increase of mortgage lending 
transferred to subsidiary covered bond companies since 2006. In 2006 there were NOK 23,25 
billion worth of mortgage loans transferred to covered bond companies. In 2012 the number 
reached NOK 670 billion. 
 
Figure 13 Total amount of mortgage loans transferred to covered bond 
companies in our sample banks. 
 
The use of covered bond companies has become an increasingly important since 2006. Table 
8 shows mortgage loans transferred to covered bond companies as a percentage of a banking 
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group’s total assets (
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
 ). As we see from the 
table, over 25 % of all banks assets are now transferred into covered bond companies and are 
therefore encumbered.  
 
Table 8 Degree of encumbered mortgage loans as percentage of total 
assets. 
 
Figure 14 illustrates the same relationship for our sample banks.  
 
Figure 14 Mortgage loans transferred to covered bond companies as 
percentage of total assets. Yearly rates. 
 
Figure 15 shows the degree of household lending which are transferred to covered bond 
companies (
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠
). As we can see, almost 70 % 
of all lending to households are transferred to subsidiary owned covered bond companies. 
Given that not all lending to households consists of mortgage loans, it also consists of 
Bank 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
DNB 2,1 % 7,2 % 12,1 % 20,9 % 24,3 % 24,6 % 25,8 %
SPV 0,0 % 0,0 % 8,6 % 12,2 % 20,6 % 26,8 % 30,6 %
Sb1 SR-Bank 0,4 % 4,6 % 8,9 % 16,7 % 16,2 % 25,6 % 25,6 %
Sb1 SMN 0,0 % 3,7 % 8,0 % 15,8 % 15,6 % 18,2 % 21,5 %
Sb1 SNN 0,0 % 3,6 % 7,4 % 14,7 % 17,5 % 19,0 % 22,5 %
Sb1 Hedmark 0,0 % 0,0 % 4,4 % 10,0 % 16,0 % 18,7 % 22,5 %
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consumer loans, car loans, etc. the degree of all households transferred to covered bond 
companies is higher.  
 
Figure 15 Percentage of all lending to households transferred to covered 
bond companies. 
Between the respective banks in our sample, the degree of mortgage loans transferred to 
covered bond companies varies. DNB has the highest degree with over 80 % of all lending to 
households transferred to its covered bond company, while the other banks in our sample have 
a more conservative degree of 40 % to 50 % transferred. There could be several reasons for 
this. DNB was the first company to introduce covered bonds already in 2005. They are by far 
the largest bank in Norway and are therefore also the leading bank in many processes. 
However, all of our sample banks have transferred between 50 % and 80 % of their lending to 
household to covered bond companies. 
From figure 14 and 15, we could also observe a phenomenon discussed earlier. The use of 
covered bonds increased sharply during the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. Due to the 
increased risk aversion in the financial markets acquiring long term senior unsecured debt 
became expensive for the banks, at some points there where even a limited availability for 
long term unsecured debt. The banks therefore increased the transfer of mortgages so they 
could issue more covered bonds. The covered bond market became an increasingly important 
source of funding during the financial crisis (Norges Bank, 2011). 
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7.4 Quality of the remaining balance sheets in the parent 
bank 
Since the holders of senior unsecured debt are exposed for changes in the parent bank, one 
important part of our study is to see how the balance in the parent bank has shifted. We will 
especially emphasise on the shift of lending in the parent bank. When mortgage loans are 
transferred into a covered bond company, all else equal, the lending in the parent bank would 
make a shift towards corporate lending. Corporate lending is composed with a higher degree 
of risk than lending to households.  
The Pillar three reports shows that the banks in our sample reports significant higher 
probability for default rates and expected loss rates on corporate lending than on lending to 
household. When dividing lending to households into lending related to real estate lending not 
related to real estate (car, consumer loans etc.) we observe significant higher loss rates on 
lending not related to real estate. 
The pillar three banks in our sample show these characteristics: 
- Corporate lending has an average probability of default (PD) rate on 2,9 % among 
our sample banks. The average expected loss (EL) rate is at 1,1 %. Among the banks 
we see that DNB has the lowest PD and EL rates, while the SpareBank 1 Banks have 
higher rates. 
- Household lending not related to real estate have an average probability of default 
rate on 2,4 %. The average expected loss rate is 0,7 % . Among the banks do 
SpareBanken Vest have the lowest PD and EL rates while the SpareBank 1 Banks 
have the highest rates. 
- Household lending with collateral in real estate have by far the lowest probability 
for default with an 0,62 % average. The expected loss is also lowest with an average 
of 0,085 %. 
As we could read from the pillar three documents, the lending which stays in the parent bank’s 
balance has a greater expected loss rate than the lending which are transferred to covered bond 
companies. 
In our research we will focus on the degree of corporate lending relative to household lending 
remaining on the parent banks’ balance after the secretion of mortgage loans. Figure 16 
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illustrates the relationship of corporate lending relatively to household lending remaining on 
the parents bank balance (
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
). A rate of 1 will illustrate an equal 
part of corporate lending and lending to households. 
 
Figure 16 Lending to Corporations relative to lending to household lending. 
X-axis: Years. Y-axis: Corporate lending / Household lending-ratio. 
 
However, there are great differences between the banks in our sample. DNB has historically 
had a high degree of lending to corporates while the smaller banks have had a lower ratio of 
lending to corporations. There are several reasons for this. As a large bank DNB has the 
possibility to take on greater commitments to large corporates which has a lower risk than 
smaller corporations. Their size also gives them the possibility to diversify, and use more 
resources on lending to corporates. Table 9 shows the difference between the member banks.  
 
Table 9 Corporate lending relative to household lending in the parent bank. 
 
As we could see from both figure 16 and table 8, the lending in the parent bank has made a 
major shift towards corporate lending. This supports our intuition of that, all else equal, a 
transfer of mortgage loans would shift the balance towards corporate lending. DNB has a 
Bank 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
DNB 1,01 1,37 2,41 3,31 3,97 5,05 4,47
SPV 0,27 0,30 0,45 0,46 0,54 0,66 0,70
Sb1 SR-Bank 0,60 0,73 0,95 1,08 1,09 1,13 1,08
Sb1 SMN 0,56 0,59 0,82 1,11 1,22 1,15 1,23
Sb1 SNN 0,50 0,56 0,58 0,60 0,62 0,65 0,74
Sb1 Hedmark 0,45 0,43 0,51 0,55 0,62 0,63 0,67
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significant larger share of corporate lending than other banks. However, we see the same trend 
among all the banks in our sample. They have gone from a corporate lending ratio of among 
30 % to a ratio greater than 50 %. 
As the bank has transferred mortgage loans it has also grown its liquidity portfolio it holds in 
the parent bank.  This is shown in figure 17. The total rate has increased from 11 % in 2006 to 
about 15 % in 2012. However, there are large differences between the banks. While DNB has 
had a relatively large liquidity portfolio from 2006, the other banks in our sample has had an 
increase in their portfolios from about 5 % in 2006, to about 15 % in 2012. 
  
 
The liquidity portfolio plays an important role managing a bank. However, the annual reports 
report the size and composition of the liquidity portfolio at a point-in-time. The liquidity 
portfolios are liquid and the size and composition of the portfolios could therefore be very 
volatile. We have therefore chosen to not emphasize on the liquidity portfolios in our study. 
7.5 Prices of senior unsecured bonds 
Senior unsecured bonds on Norwegian Banks are traded daily in the financial markets. 
However, there has historically been a low transparency in the Norwegian bond market. Not 
all trades have been reported to the stock exchange and the trades have occurred over the 
Figure 17 Liquidity portfolio as percentage of the 
total asset in the parent bank. 
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counter21. Getting sufficient data on each banks bond prices have therefore been difficult. We 
have acquired second hand indicated bonds spreads on fixed maturities from a panel of bonds 
from different brokerages in Norway. The bond prices observed from the brokerages should 
represent the largest banks in Norway who are also represented in our panel. 
Figure 18 illustrates time series of senior unsecured bonds spreads in basis points for DNB 
and large Norwegian “coastal banks”, which includes the banks in our sample. They indicate 
the spreads over 3 month NIBOR rate or swap rate with different fixed maturities. 
 
Figure 18 Spread on senior unsecured bonds (Nordea, 2013). 
 
As we could see, bond spreads where very little volatile until the start of the financial crisis. 
In our research we will need to adjust for this. The spread between DNB and the costal banks 
have historically been between 4-8 basis points. During the most severe turmoil in the financial 
crisis this spread increased to about 10 basis points. However, in mid-2009 the spread between 
DNB and the coastal banks went back to 5 basis points and have been on these levels since.  
In our analysis we have chosen the five year fixed maturity to represent the bond spreads. For 
DNB we will use the 5 year sized bank spread. Due to the low transparency for spreads for the 
                                                 
21 Over the counter, or OTC trading is when two parts trade with each other without going through any stock exchange. All 
bond trading in Norway go over the counter. However, the different brokerages have lately been required to report their trades 
to Oslo Stock Exchange so they can provide transparency to the markets. 
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different costal banks we have chosen to use the 5 year costal bank spread as a reference spread 
for all the six remaining banks. 
We have chosen to use the five year fixed maturity. Most trades done in the secondary market 
are done on maturities around 5 years. This gives the market a good transparency and gives 
the brokerages a good data sample to base their indicative prices on.  
7.6 Measured variables in our research 
In our study we observed five variables over time which we have decided to test against the 
margin spreads of senior unsecured bonds in our sample banks. We will use the time series 
from each of these variables on our sample banks to generate a panel data set. 
7.6.1 Size, 𝒙𝟏  
Size is important for banks. Being a named and sized bank gives many direct and indirect 
consequences. The most important direct consequences of are economics of scale and greater 
access to funding. A named bank will have an easier access in the financial markets due to its 
name and its broad investment base. Investors would also be more comfortable investing in a 
sized bank due to the liquidity of its issued instruments. Instruments of sized banks are traded 
daily in the markets in opposition to smaller banks whose instruments could be traded weekly, 
or even more infrequent. 
One indirect consequence for a bank is the implicit state guarantees a sized bank has. If the 
general creditors of a sized bank are required to take a loss on its investments/deposits it may 
cause great financial turmoil. The threshold for letting a large bank go bankrupt is higher than 
for a small bank. We will discuss this further in the analysis of our findings. 
7.6.2 Degree of encumbrance of mortgage loans as a percentage 
of the total balance 𝒙𝟐  
The encumbrance of mortgage loans is the main focus in our research. We will test if the 
percentage of mortgage loans transferred to a covered bond company has an impact on the 
spreads of the banks. Since the mortgage loans which are transferred also are encumbered and 
that Norwegian banks aren’t allowed to use encumbrance in the parent bank this will give us 
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a measure of the encumbrance in the banks. A higher degree of encumbrance will give a higher 
risk, all else equal.  
7.6.3 Corporate lending relative to household lending in the parent 
bank, 𝒙𝟑  
When mortgage loans are encumbered holders of senior unsecured debt will be exposed for 
the assets which are left in the parent bank. Corporate lending relative to household lending 
gives aa measure of the balance composition. Since the expected loss are higher in corporate 
lending will a higher lending to corporates give a higher risk, all else equal. 
7.6.4 Capital adequacy, 𝒙𝟒  
Capital adequacy is measured by adding equity and subordinated debt. This is the capital that 
is subordinated to the general creditors of the bank. A higher capital adequacy will therefore 
give a lower risk for the banks general creditors given all else equal. 
7.6.5 Profitability given by return on equity (ROE), 𝒙𝟓 
A banks return on equity is one of the most important key-numbers for banks. Investors, 
analysts and management itself watches this number close. A higher return on equity tells us 
that the bank has a higher ability to pay interest and principal on their loans. A higher return 
on equity will therefor give a lower risk all else equal. 
7.6.6 Dummy variable: The financial crisis  
In our research we have used a dummy variable in the year of the financial crisis. The worst 
impact from the financial crisis came in 2008. However, in the credit- and money markets 
the turmoil started earlier. Already in 2007 one started to see that the risk premiums in the 
money markets started to rise. The TED-spread which is given by the difference between the 
3 month USD-Libor rate (London interbank offered rate in US-dollar) and the 3 months 
treasury bills issued by the US-government. The USD-Libor rate is the interest rate named 
banks use to lend unsecured to each other’s in the London money market with 3 months 
maturity. This rate reflects, off course, the future short term rates the next three months, but 
also the credit and liquidity risk among the bank market since the banks lend unsecured with 
each other. The treasury bills have a low rate of credit risk since the risk for the US 
government to default on their three months payments are extremely low (MacroBond, 
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2013). Figure 19 shows the TED-spread from 2005 until May 2013.  From the figure we 
could see that the risk premiums in the money market already increased in august 2007. This 
was when the French Bank BNP Paribas reported that two of its hedge funds had large 
difficulties taking money out of their funds due to illiquidity in the markets.
 
Figure 19 Ted Spread 2005 - 2013 (MacroBond, 2013) 
The most common way to measure money markets turmoil in Norway is the spread between 
the 3 month NIBOR (Norwegian interbank offered rate) and the policy rate set by the 
Norwegian bank. Since the 3 month NIBOR rate is a function of the expected short term rates 
the next period the NIBOR would also price in expected changes in the policy rate. However, 
it is also a function of the credit and liquidity risk and we could well observe an increased 
spread in times of financial turmoil. Figure 20 illustrates the spread between the 3 m NIBOR 
and the policy rate. Norwegian money markets are affected by the international ones, and we 
witnessed an increased spread from mid-2007. However, the spread held high levels until mid-
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2012. 
 
Figure 20 Spread between 3M NIBOR and policy rate (MacroBond, 2013) 
7.7 Method – Fixed effect method 
To test if our variables have a significant effect on the credit spreads we have made a set of 
panel data. Our panel data is represented by five independent predictive variables measured 
on six individual banks. We have measured these variables repeatedly over a time period. In 
order to adjust for the financial- and euro- crisis we have used a dummy variable. However, 
we will test our five variables with and without the use of the financial crisis dummy. We will 
test these variables against the indicated second hand credit spreads for senior unsecured banks 
in our sample. The credit spreads denotes our dependent variable. These spreads are shown in 
figure 19. 
By using this panel data we could capture both the variation over the sample of banks and 
variation over time. The six banks in our sample have had unequal developments during our 
research period.  By using panel data we can control for variables that we cannot observe or 
measure. This could for an example be differences between banks. It could as well be a 
variable that has changed for the whole group of entities. Examples of this are policy changes 
and regulations. When using panel data we were allowed to include variables at different 
levels. This has given us the possibility to use variables that are on different level in a bank’s 
operations, for an example using both size and profitability as variables (Woolridge, 2009). 
The data in a panel set would have the following form.  
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Formula 10 
𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
The variables are noted x, where i is the type of variable and t is the time dimension. The panel 
of data would create a matrix of the independent variables. Our set of panel data is fully 
balanced; this means that we have sufficient data for all variables in all years in our data set. 
To test if the variables in our panel data sample have an effect on the spreads of the senior 
unsecured bonds we have chosen to use the fixed-effect model. The fixed-effect model can be 
denoted as:  
Formula 11 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
And:  
Formula 12 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 which equals the error term 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = Is the dependent variable, i is the entity and t is the time 
𝛼𝑖 = Is the intercept for each entity i  
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = Is the independent variables 
𝛽𝑖 = Denotes the coefficient for the independent variables 
𝜇𝑖 = Denotes time-invariant individual specific effects of each variable. 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = Denotes time-variant errors for each variable over time.  
We will use the fixed effect model because we have a set of variables that vary over time, and 
we are interested in analysing the causes these variables might have on changes in the 
dependent variable. It also controls for all time-invariant characteristics of the banks.  
The fixed effect model is designed to study how the predicative variables cause changes for 
the dependent variable. Using the fixed effect model we will explore the relationship between 
the credit spreads and the different predicative variables from our banks.  
All the predictor variables in our research changes over time, none are constant. This allows 
us to use the fixed effect model.  If we were to analyse time-invariant characteristics we might 
have wanted to use a different a different type of regression, like the random effect regression.  
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However, using the fixed effect model we assume that some individual characteristics among 
our banks might or might not have an impact on the outcome of our credit spreads. These 
individual characteristics could for an example be that the banks are systematic important, 
reaches a broader investment base, or are in a greater size than all others.  
One example of this is DNB. It has a greater size than all other banks. It is also an 
internationally named bank and has historically had a broad access to the financial market. 
Senior unsecured bonds issued by DNB do also have a greater liquidity in the second hand 
market than bonds issued by the other banks. The fixed effect model would control for these 
time-invariant individual effects. The fact that DNB is a sized and named bank would be 
considered a time-invariant difference between the banks and would therefore not be taken 
into account. As one of our predictive variables is size, the fixed effect-model would only 
emphasize on how an individual banks growth in size over time would affect credit spreads.  
The same control counts DNB being a systematic important bank. This would also not be taken 
into account in this model since being systematic important is time-invariant in our research 
period. 
The fixed effect model adjusts for all these unobserved effects by eliminating them from the 
regression function.  This allows the model to fully access the predictor variables net effect on 
the dependent variable. However, these characteristics may impact either the dependent or 
independent variable. Therefore we will also assume that there is a correlation between the 
banks error term and the predictor variables used in our task. 
The individual characteristics of DNB do not correlate with any other banks. That the 
individual characteristics of one entity (bank) not correlate with any other individual 
characteristics in other entities, that they are unique, is an important assumption in the fixed 
effect model. If the individual characteristic were to correlate with each other the fixed effect 
model would not be suitable for the research. The inferences might not be correct and we 
would have to model that relationship. 
Not taking into account time-invariable effects could contribute to weaknesses in using the 
fixed effect model in our analysis. Individual effects may play a great part in the setting of 
credit spreads. This will be discussed further in the presentation of our results. 
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Since the fixed-effect model controls for the time-invariant characteristics between the 
individuals we cannot bias the estimated coefficients from the model. This is another critic of 
using the fixed effect model  
We have chosen to use five predictive variables in our task. An increase use of predictive 
variables in our data set will increases the noise in our data set increases as well. We will suffer 
a trade-off between adding more predictive variables and the noise it introduces. We will 
therefore test our fixed effect model conducting several tests excluding one or several 
predictive variables to see if it gives or study a more explanatory power. 
7.8 Results 
In this chapter will we present the results from our research made on the five independent 
variables used to estimate the dependent variable, which are the credit spreads. Further in the 
chapter we will discuss the results with respect to our predicative variables. 
We have conducted several fixed-effect regressions on our set of panel data. While testing or 
variables we did also introduce a financial crisis dummy. We have tested our predictive 
variables against the credit spreads both with and without the financial crisis variable. 
The first set of results shows our predictive variables tested against the credit spreads. We 
have used a financial crisis dummy from the year of 2008 to and including 2012. The results 
are shown in table 10. 
 
Table 10 Fixed-effect regression with financial crisis dummy in 2008-2012. 
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This test shows a high explanatory power with an r-squared of 0,969. The size, the degree of 
encumbrance and profitability given by ROE has significant effects on the dependent variable; 
credit spreads, within a 95 % confidence interval. However, Size has an coefficient of 0,00211 
which is too low for it to have an significant effect on the credit spreads. Profitability had a 
coefficient of -4,049, while encumbrance had an coefficient of 2.32. 
The financial crisis dummy has a t-value of 8.03 and gives us confidence that the credit spreads 
are affected by the financial crisis. 
Doing the same test while using the financial crisis dummy from 2007 to and including 2012 
shows some different results. Table 11 shows the results from this test. 
 
Table 11 Fixed effect regression with a financial crisis dummy in 2007-2012 
 
This test does as well have a high explanatory power with an r-squared of 0,9356. It shows 
that the degree of encumbrance and profitability has a significant affection on the credit 
spreads at the 95 % confidence level. Profitability has a high coefficient of -9,487, while 
encumbrance had an positive coefficient of 4,211 points. 
The financial crisis dummy observes a lot of noise in the data. We have conducted the fixed 
effect regression without the use of the financial. Table 12 shows the results from the test 
without the use of the financial crisis dummy.  
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Table 12 The fixed effect regression without the financial crisis dummy. 
 
The results are not significant different from the tests with the financial crisis dummy. 
Encumbrance and profitability had significant effects within the 95 % confidence interval on 
the credit spreads. The coefficient of encumbrance was at 4,2 points, for profitability -9,48 
points.  
7.8.1 Excluding DNB from our sample 
The largest bank in our sample is by far DNB. Due to its size and systematic importance it 
distinguishes itself from the other banks. We have therefore conducted the exact same fixed 
effect regression tests on the five remaining banks. The five remaining banks are in many ways 
more similar to each other and create a more equal data set eliminating some of the individual 
characteristics that DNB has. .  
The test shows a significant drop in the t-values of both size and encumbrance. Profitability 
was only the significant variable in all tests. The coefficient was on -5 to -10 points. Capital 
adequacy was only significant on the 95 % confidence level on one test including the financial 
crisis dummy from 2007 to 2012. However it had a positive coefficient of 14 points.  
All regressions showed a significant drop in the t-value for size and encumbrance as variables. 
Profitability and capital adequacy stands out with t-values within the 95 % level confidence in 
all of the regressions. 
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7.9 Results with respect to each variable 
7.9.1 Predictive Variable 1 – Size 
The results from our tests indicated that changes size did not have cause for changes in the 
credit spreads.  
In the regression tests including DNB size tested as a significant variable within the 95 % 
confidence level only when using the financial crisis dummy in the years from 2008 to and 
including 2012. However, the coefficient in this test indicated a low level of effect. In the tests 
conducted with other time periods for the use of the financial crisis dummies and the test 
conducted without DNB indicated that size had no cause for changes in the credit spreads.  
Throughout our data set of spreads, which are from 1999, DNB has had lower credit spreads 
than the remaining banks in our test sample. In other financial markets it is also observed that 
greater sized banks achieve lower credit spreads than smaller ones.  One should therefore argue 
that size has an affection of the credit spread. This will be discussed further on. 
Since the fixed effect model are designed to study the causes for changes within our banks the 
model might have difficulties picking up the size-effect. The model will focus on how the 
change in size causes changes in the credit spread. We could argue that the level of size matters 
more than the change in size. The fixed effect would not take into account the starting level of 
size in a bank. The level of size would be a time-invariant individual characteristic and would 
therefore not show significant values in our research. The same counts for systematic 
importance, as a bank becomes systematic important it often stays like that for a long time and 
it could therefore be characterised as a time-invariant individual characteristic. 
Our study could prove that changes in size have no effect on the credit spreads over a short 
period of time. However, the level of size a bank has might have a great impact on the credit 
spreads a bank achieves in the credit markets. 
7.9.2 Predictive Variable 2 – Degree of encumbrance 
The results from our tests on the whole data panel indicated that changes in the level of 
encumbrance had a significant cause for change in the credit spreads. In both the tests 
conducted with and without the financial crisis the change of level in encumbrance had a effect 
on the credit spreads within the 95 % confidence level. A higher degree of encumbered assets 
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gave a higher credit spread.  The coefficient from given in the tests was positive and had high 
values of 4 points and higher. 
While conducting the fixed effect tests excluding the data from DNB none of the test results 
showed that changes in the degree of encumbrance had a significant effect on the credit spreads 
on a 95 % confidence level.   
The results from our tests are very uncertain, and we cannot conclude with high confidence 
weather the changes in the degree of encumbrance causes changes in the credit spreads. We 
will discuss this further in chapter eight were we shortly compare the encumbrance and spreads 
of other Nordic banks with the sample of our banks. 
7.9.3 Predictive Variable 3 – Balance composition 
None of our tests showed that changes in the balance composition had a cause of changes in 
the credit spreads within a 95 % confident level. 
However, the changes in balance composition could somewhat be reflected by the degree of 
encumbrance, which is given by variable 3. The correlation between the grade of encumbrance 
and the balance sheet composition is at 0.843 which lead us to conducting a test excluding the 
grade of encumbrance to study if changes in the balance composition caused aa change in the 
credit spreads. The results of the test showed an increase in the t-values, but not to the 95 % 
confidence level. 
From our study we can conclude on the fact that changes in balance composition does not 
cause a change in the credit spread over the short term. 
7.9.4 Predictive Variable 4 – Profitability (ROE) 
All the tests conducted on our data sample indicated that an increase in profitability caused 
lower credit spreads. In all tests they got high t-levels which indicate that we can with a high 
confidence say that the profitability has a cause on changes on the credit spreads. The 
coefficients given in the results shows high values at 4 points and exceeding in the all the tests 
including DNB, when removing DNB the coefficient values doubled.  
Profitability in itself is a uncertain measurement. Profitability is the sum of several different 
characteristics of a bank. It contains factors like how much income it is generating and at 
 89 
which level their costs are at. It does also tell us about the amount of losses a bank is 
experiencing. Banks with higher risk would experience higher volatility in losses and therefore 
also a higher volatility in its profitability. However, a high profitability tells the market 
something about a bank’s ability to pay interest rates and principals on its debt. In periods of 
severe financial turmoil will a higher profitability give a bank the ability to retain its profits 
and build equity. 
Using return on equity (ROE) is also affected by the amount of equity a bank is holding. For 
a given earnings, the ROE would increase with a lower share of equity. A lower share of equity 
would give a higher risk for the remaining holders in a bank’s capital structure which again 
could lead to higher capital structure.  
Higher credit spreads have an affection on the lending costs for a bank, and therefore also the 
profitability of a bank. This could lead to a question about causality between the independent 
and dependent variable. Would changes in the credit spread cause changes in the profitability 
before the changes in profitability changes causes changes in the credit spread? The answer is 
no. The margins on the credit loans are fixed on each loan, so changes in the credit spread over 
a short period of time would only affect the banks funding which are refinanced at that point. 
It would be then be a time-delay from the change in the credit spread occur to it will affect the 
probability. 
Research from Nordea Markets22 indicates that banks with a higher ROE have a greater pricing 
of its equity given by the price-to-book value in the financial markets. A bank with a greater 
price-to-book value would have a higher cost of its equity and are therefore in a greater 
position in the financial markets when issuing new equity which it might be required to in 
cases of financial turmoil. This could be insuring for the remaining investors in the capital 
structure, including holders of senior unsecured debt. This will be discussed further in chapter 
eight. 
From our study we can conclude that an increase in the profitability given by the ROE is 
causing a decrease in the credit spreads. 
                                                 
22 Research conducted in 2013 (Nordea, 2013) 
 90
 
7.9.5 Predictive Variable 5 – Capital Adequacy 
The tests conducted in our data sample indicated different results on the changes in capital 
adequacy’s cause on changes in the credit spreads. When conducting the tests with all banks 
included in the test sample capital adequacy indicated no significant cause on the 95 % 
confidence level. Conducting the tests without DNB gave a significant cause for change when 
adding the financial crisis dummy in the years 2007 to 2012. More surprisingly was it that it 
the coefficient was positive indicating that a higher capital adequacy caused higher credit 
spreads. Theoretically would a higher capital adequacy give a higher share of loss absorbing 
capital and more protection for the banks general creditors which include owners of senior 
unsecured debt. 
The capital adequacy ratio has a link between the banks ROE. Equity accounts for the greatest 
share in the capital adequacy. Given all else equal; a higher share of equity would give a higher 
capital adequacy, but a lower return on equity. 
Our study cannot with a high confidence indicate that changes in the capital adequacy has a 
cause for changes in the credit spreads. 
7.10 Summary 
The most significant finding in our study was that changes in profitability given by the return 
on equity caused changes in the credit spread. An increase in the return on equity gave a 
decrease in the credit spreads. All tests indicated that profitability had a significant cause for 
change on the 95 % confidence level. The coefficients varied between – 5 points to – 10 points 
indicating that a percentage higher ROE gave a decrease in five to ten basis points in the credit 
spreads. 
Profitability given by the ROE is a measurement affected by several different characteristics 
in a bank, including income, costs, losses and the level of equity. However, a high ROE is 
appreciated by equity investors and a high appreciation in the equity markets could give 
insurance for the remaining investors in the capital structure. 
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The second most significant variable was that a change in the degree of encumbrance of the 
total balance caused changes in the credit spreads. An increase in the encumbered assets gave 
an increase in the credit spreads. However, when removing DNB from our test panel, a change 
in the degree of encumbrance no longer showed a significant cause of changes in the credit 
spreads. 
Changes in size, the capital adequacy and the composition of the balance remaining in the 
parent bank showed no significant cause of change for the credit spreads in senior unsecured 
bonds. 
A banks profitability given by the ROE is not affected by the encumbrance and changes in the 
balance sheet directly. From the results in our study we could therefore argue that the increased 
use of covered bond companies and the changes in the balance sheets remaining in the parent 
bank not has a significant effect on the credit spreads of senior unsecured bonds. 
7.11 Criticism 
We could criticize our analysis on several points. The first point is the time frame in our 
analysis. The first covered bond company was established in 2005. However, the use of 
covered bond companies did not really increase to a matter before 2007 when the Norwegian 
covered bond legislation was implemented. This gives us a short time frame and a limited 
panel of data to analyse. 
The Norwegian market might also not have taken into account the changes that have happened 
in a bank’s capital structure. It could take time for the market participants to adopt the changes 
in the capital structure. The investors may be in a “wait-and-see” modus, not really knowing 
how to price the new senior unsecured bonds compared with the pricing before. Many of the 
investors in senior unsecured bonds are either mutual funds, pension funds or other large 
institutional clients who “have” to own senior unsecured bank bonds. One reason might be the 
investment requirements framework they work under, another reason might be the 
supply/demand of these bonds. A limited supply of senior unsecured bonds could decrease the 
price. We will discuss this further in chapter eight. 
Using a fixed effect regression we would try to study the causes of changes in the credit spread. 
The fixed-effect analysis would also control for all time-invariant characteristics of an 
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individual bank. However, we would need to do a more comprehensive analysis of these 
individual characteristics to get a deeper insight into what really causes changes in the credit 
spreads. Some of these characteristics will be studied in chapter eight. 
Some criticism may also be pointed at our data set of the dependent variables; the credit 
spreads of the senior unsecured bonds. We have gathered data from different brokerages and 
Norges Bank. However, the prices are indicative prices in the second hand market. In times of 
severe financial turmoil and a lack of liquidity in the markets one might have difficulties 
setting the prices. 
The time frame for our study is including a period where several outside factors have been 
affecting the financial sector, the banks and the prices of senior unsecured debt. Both the 
financial crisis and the euro-debt crisis have led to an increase in risk premiums for all financial 
instruments. In addition to this banks must face political uncertainty and a new financial 
framework. 
7.11.1 Further research 
All these factors indicate that a set of fixed-effect tests not gives a comprehensive enough 
analysis to understand what is driving the prices in the senior unsecured bond market. We will 
therefore, in addition to our quantitative approach, analyse what might cause changes in the 
senior unsecured bond prices in a qualitative approach. 
In the next chapter we will discuss further alternative factors that might or might not have 
caused the changes in the senior unsecured bond prices. We will first discuss factors that are 
related to our findings in the quantitative research. Further we will discuss additional factors 
that might play an important role.  
7.12 Discussion of other effects 
In this chapter we first off will discuss different approaches to our findings in the quantitative 
research. We will compare the findings from our analysis with characteristics from different 
banks operating in different countries, and try to evaluate our results from a different point of 
views. 
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Further we will discuss other factors that might play an important role in the pricing of senior 
unsecured bonds. In the end we will look at different factors that might play an important role 
in the future pricing of covered bonds. 
7.13 Alternative discussion to our findings 
7.13.1 Size 
In our study we observed that changes in the size did not cause changes in the credit spreads 
on a significant level. However, we observe that greater sized banks often achieve lower credit 
spreads in the financial markets. In our data set, going back from 1999, we observe that DNB 
has had a lower credit spread on its senior unsecured prices during the period. 
Market participants argue that DNB achieves lower credit spreads for two reasons. The first 
reason is that the size and systematic importance DNB has in the Norwegian Bank Market. 
DNB plays an important role in the financial sector in Norway. Almost every participant in 
the financial sector has DNB as counterparty in some way. A bankruptcy of DNB would 
therefore be severe for the whole financial sector.  The second reason is that DNB reaches a 
broader spectre of investors which creates a higher base for demand for their issued bonds. 
These two factor correlates to some extent. A sized bank will be systematic important and at 
the same time be forced to reach broader investor spectres. One third reason that can argue for 
the lower spreads of DNB is the Norwegian Governments 34 % ownership in the bank. 
Over the last several decades the financial system has become more complex and the banks 
have increased in size. Banks have become of such a great size that a single bankruptcy cold 
cause a severe financial turmoil and lead to an economic downturn (BIS, 2012). 
Asli Demirgüc-Kunt from the World Bank and Harry Huizinga from CEPR (2012) did a 
research on banks size and its cause on performance, strategy and market discipline. Their 
results shows that a bank which is “too big to fail” (of a great systemic importance) experiences 
lower funding costs if the bank operates within a nationality that has an ability to save the bank 
in case of a bankruptcy. The case for DNB fits well in this description. DNB is a bank which 
can be considered too big to fail by many market participants. The Norwegian government has 
a solid financial position and will be prepared to save the bank if necessary. According to 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga this could lead to a decrease of the funding costs. 
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They further argue that if a bank is too big to fail and operates within a nationality that could 
have difficulties saving the bank it could experience higher funding cost.  
Schich and Kim (2012) discussed this phenomenon in the OECD Journal of Financial Trends. 
They argued that the market expected a high implicit guarantee in banks that were stationed 
in a nationality with a high financial strength. Further they saw the value of this implicit 
guarantee decreasing sharply as the sovereign strength decreased. 
A nation’s willingness to save the banks is also an important factor. An example of this is the 
Danish governments approach to distressed banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 
2008. Moody’s investor services (2011) argued that all Danish banks would suffer a long-term 
rise in funding costs after the regional bank Amagerbanken A/S failure in February 2011. This 
failure triggered the first loss of senior unsecured creditors in the European Union. 
 
7.13.2 Profitability 
All tests in our study indicated that changes in profitability given by ROE had an significant 
cause of changes in the credit spreads. An increased ROE gave a decline in the credit spreads. 
As earlier mentioned, ROE is a measure capturing several different characteristics within a 
bank. 
One reason for the relationship between the ROE and the credit spread can be the degree of 
losses. As owners of senior unsecured bonds, by definition, only are exposed for losses if a 
bank defaults they would be worried by the amount of losses a bank experiences. 
Economically, increased losses would both increase the risk of a bank default and decrease 
the ROE given all else equal. 
A higher ROE may also increase investors’ confidence in a bank. Research conducted by 
Nordea Markets indicates that banks with a high ROE are traded on higher price to book value 
levels. The relationship is shown in figure 21. The price to book value level is a measurement 
that shows how the market prices a bank of its book value. It is given by the market 
capitalization of the bank which gives the markets pricing of a bank’s equity divided by the 
book value of its equity 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
. A price to book value level greater than one 
indicates that the markets prices the equity in a bank higher than the books indicates, a level 
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lower than one indicates that the markets are pricing the equity with a discount to the book 
values. A high price to book value is often seen in relation to a high valuation of a company 
 
Figure 21 Price/Book Value versus ROE on European banks (Nordea, 2013). 
 
Investors in senior unsecured bonds might appreciate a high stock market valuation of a 
company. First of all, a high stock market valuation indicates that the financial markets believe 
in the future of the company. Second of all, management are more comfortable issuing new 
equity at high valuation levels. At high valuation levels, the cost of equity is low which could 
give an incentive to rise equity.  
7.13.3 Encumbrance 
We found that encumbrance had a significant effect in some of the tests. The case of 
encumbrance in banks has had an increasing attention in the markets in the past few years.     
As the financial crisis led to a loss of confidence in banks unsecured bank bonds became an 
unpopular investment among investors. This led to an increase in the use of covered bonds 
hence increased encumbrance 
Market participants have had a different view on this. Dr. Steffen Meusel from the Financial 
Supervisory Authority of Germany (2012) argues that a high encumbrance would have a 
detrimental effect on the unsecured creditors of the bank, hence the holders of senior unsecured 
bonds. All else equal, increased encumbrance would increase the loss given default. Dr. 
Meusel further argues that the increased use of covered bonds in relation to unsecured bonds 
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could more exposed to bail-in plans meaning that senior unsecured bond holders would not be 
fully saved in the case of an bankruptcy. 
Longdon (2012) discussed in a paper that senior bonds would become more equal to 
subordinated bonds due to the increased encumbrance and that the loss given default most 
likely has increased. They also discuss how an increased use of covered bonds might increase 
the risk for a bail-in for senior unsecured creditors.  
Longdon (2012) argues that all though the loss given default has risen, the probability of 
default has decreased given a lower funding and liquidity risk. They further discuss the treat 
for a possible subordination of senior unsecured bonds to depositors in case of a default. 
Most market participants argue that the risk has increased for senior unsecured debt holders 
due to the increased encumbrance. However, they are all awaiting a resolution on how the 
owners of senior unsecured debt are treated in the case of a default. In the next section we will 
discuss this further.  
7.14 Crisis resolution and government interference 
During the financial crisis the government backed banks that experienced severe turmoil. 
Governments intervened both indirectly by stimulating the credit and money markets and 
directly by lending directly to the banks. In Norway banks were allowed to swap covered 
bonds in exchange for state issued certificates which would give them liquidity. Banks were 
also search the States Finance Fund for funding in more risky assets like tier one bonds or 
equity. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis and the bank crisis European authorities have started 
working on a resolution on how to manage a bank failure. The result of this resolution would 
play an important part for holders of senior unsecured debt. There are several arising questions 
due to this resolution. When would the government let a bank go bankrupt? Would the holders 
of senior unsecured debt be bailed in or out? If not, would they be subordinated to depositors? 
And, would the government take into account the degree of encumbrance? 
The governments intervene with the banks made a lot of banks get through the crisis. By the 
end of 2009 many banks were back on their own feet and were making money again. The 
amount of banks which has failed was low. Fitch (2012) reported that the five year cumulative 
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default rate of banks was very low at only 0,9 %. Further on, they reported that the rate of 
banks that would have defaulted without government help would be as high as 7,1 %. There 
is therefore clearly that governments support is reducing the risk for senior unsecured debt 
holders. A resolution proposing a bail-in would lead both a higher default rate of banks and a 
higher loss given default for unsecured bond holders. 
One could therefore with a great confidence say that a resolution which includes bail-in policy 
of the banks senior unsecured debt holders would increase the expected loss of senior 
unsecured bond holders and so on the credit spread for senior unsecured bond holders 
(Longsdon, 2012).  
The government has taken a lot of criticism from the masses since it has helped the banks.  A 
broad view of the public masses is that bank’s should been let go to a greater extent. However, 
letting a bank go and making senior unsecured debt holders take a loss might have great social 
economic costs. After the Danish government made senior unsecured bond holders take a loss 
in Amagerbanken in 2011 costs of funding went up for all banks (Moody’s, 2011) which again 
made credit expensive for the broad masses of Denmark. 
The European commission have started working on aa resolution. However, there is given 
little or no signals on what the resolution would look like. 
7.14.1 Depositor preferences  
Deposits not guaranteed by any deposit insurance do currently have the same priority in the 
capital structure as senior unsecured debt. That means that depositors have the same amount 
of credit risk as a holder of senior unsecured bonds. The liquidity risk is lower since deposits 
can be removed at a short notice and does not need to be sold in the markets.  Dhami and Jones 
(2013) argue that a potential depositor’s preference indicates a larger threat to owners of senior 
unsecured debt than the encumbrance. If senior unsecured debt becomes subordinated to 
depositors one would witness a whole new repricing of senior unsecured bonds. CreditSights 
(2012) discusses the structural subordination of senior unsecured bonds and argues that it 
would have a higher on senior unsecured bond holders than the level of encumbrance. Fitch 
(2012) argues that a possible depositor’s preference must be seen in context with encumbrance 
and that a subordination of senior unsecured bond holders to depositors would make the senior 
unsecured debt holders more disciplining on banks in relation to their encumbrance.  
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During the late financial turmoil on Cyprus depositors not covered by the deposit guarantee 
were required to take a loss. At one level in the negotiations one proposition even suggested 
that guaranteed depositors would take a loss.  This created a lot of turmoil among the masses 
in Cyprus. How the Cyprus Bank crisis was handled was criticised from many parties, among 
them the ECB. This underlines the importance of having a solid and clear resolution for 
handling a bank default. 
As mentioned earlier, Norwegian depositors are guaranteed deposits of NOK 2 million by the 
Guarantee Fond. For those depositors with more than NOK 2 million, this problem can be 
solved by limiting the deposits in each bank to NOK 2 million.  In 2011 the Norges Bank and 
FSA stated: “Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet share the view that statutory bail-in may be a 
suitable tool for recapitalising a bank, or parts of a bank, when a recapitalisation is deemed 
necessary to sustain access to essential services”. They further argue:  “The possibility of 
bail-in may force also large banks to pay a price for their debt that to a greater extent reflects 
the underlying risk of the banks.” In other words, the government is using the risk of bail-in 
as a way to discipline the banks with the help of the market. 
The outcome of a bankruptcy resolution for banks would play an important role in the future 
for senior unsecured bonds. Both the risk and pricing could be drastically changed. Several 
factors are pointing to the direction of a bail-in and that owners of senior unsecured bonds will 
carry a larger burden in case of a default. If this occurs it could change the entire funding 
structure and operation structure of a bank. 
7.15 Supply/Demand Balances and the Clientele effect 
Prices in the financial market are, as in most other markets, heavily affected by the supply and 
demand for the loans given. The introduction of covered bonds has both attracted new 
investors and allowed investors to hold a greater deal of bank related bonds. While investors 
earlier on could invest in senior unsecured bonds or subordinated bonds they now have a safer 
alternative to invest in. 
Covered bonds issued by the covered bond companies in our study do all have a tipple-A 
(AAA) rating by an official rating agency. This implies a very low degree of expected loss. 
This allows investors who search more secure investments to buy bonds issued by the bank. It 
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has changed the composition of the bank bond holders allowing large institutional market 
participants like pension funds and insurance companies to take a bigger stake in the bank.  
This could be related to an effect called the clientele effect. Further in this section will we 
discuss this effect and how it has affected the total the supply/demand balance of a banks 
issued bonds. 
7.15.1 The Clientele effect 
During the financial crises, covered bonds proved to be a very popular financial security. Other 
financial securities, as certain government bonds and senior bonds, experienced tough time as 
the lack of certainty was gone. The phenomenon is called “flight to quality” and refers to the 
trend of investors unloading riskier investments instead of more stable ones.  In order to find 
out how and why exactly covered bonds experienced this sudden popularity, we use the 
theorical framework of “The Clientele effect”. 
The Clientele effect explained 
In 1961 Miller & Modigliani defined the clientele effect as a trend for investors to buy certain 
stocks with a particular dividend payout. The explanation behind this is that the investors (i.e. 
the clientele) seek a different composition of stocks because of the various proportions of 
capital gains and dividends. Miller & Modigliani explained this by the imperfection of the 
capital market, as transaction cost and taxes. If this theory is correct it would mean that 
stockholders could be divided into different segments, clienteles, as tax minimization induced 
clientele and transaction cost induced minimization clientele.  
By comparing institutional investors and investors with low income, (Allen, Bernardo and 
Welch, 2000) gave a good example of institutional investors choosing stocks with high 
dividend ratio because of the tax advantages the institutions experience. Low income investors 
prefer more stable stocks paying high dividend payouts since the transactions cost are too high 
and they rather enjoy the tax expense on the dividend payout. By this, it can be argued that the 
investors prefer firms which have a suitable payout policy to the firm specific situation. 
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The Clientele effect on covered bonds: who are the investors? 
During the financial crises, several high rated bonds got downgraded from investment grade 
to non-investment grade hence triggering investors operating under certain quality restrictions 
to sell. This led to a change of investors and in that way leading to a clientele change. Even 
though the amount of highly graded bonds fell, the investors still had requirements to meet 
and started so seeking other securities that could meet their requirements.  
 
Figur 22 Distribution of Norwegian Covered Bonds issued in Norway 
(Baltzersen, 2013) 
By looking at the distribution of covered bonds issued in Norway, we get a deeper 
understanding of who is holding the bonds. Somewhat surprisingly, we found that most of the 
bonds are owned by other Norwegian banks (44%).  In conversations with different bankers 
and life insurance companies it came clear that the reason behind this was the indeed the 
clientele effect: the covered bonds could offer as a diversified investment being both a safe 
and long term investment. 
As of 17th January 2012 55% of a total of NOK 661 billion was denoted in Norwegian kroner. 
To make Norwegian covered bonds more preferable for foreign investors, the credit 
institutions started issuing covered bonds denoted in different currencies. By issuing bonds in 
foreign currency and hence eliminating the currency risk for foreign investors, Norwegian 
credit institutions approached a new kind of clientele. 
44%
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Figur 23 Currency distribution of Norwegian Covered bonds (Stephansen, 
2012). 
Covered bonds offering high transparency and high recoveries while the safety of covered 
bonds is backed by regulations having a privileged treatment in different areas of the EU 
financial market (as low risk-weights), encourages institutional investors to engage themselves 
more in this highly regulated market. Since the nature of covered bonds has the housing market 
as the underlying asset and a strong bondholder protection, the covered bonds are quite 
different from the corporate bonds or government bonds. This makes them a unique 
diversification investment.  
7.16 Regulatory Arbitrage 
By regulatory arbitrage we mean the structuring of a financial product in such a way that it 
brings the lowest regulatory burden when it comes to terms of administrative burden or that it 
surpasses a regulatory regime. Regulatory arbitrage has been labeled as a way of exploiting 
loopholes in the law. Merton Miller (1986) said that “The major impulses to successful 
innovations over the past twenty years have come, I am saddened to have to say, from 
regulation and taxes”. As new regulation comes, new, innovative ways to utilize the regulation 
show up. Siegelaer and Walhof (2007) divide regulatory arbitrage in three parts 
 Evading a regulatory requirement within the same regime 
 Shifting to another regulatory regime 
 Flying beneath the regulatory radar 
55%
38%
2% 4% 1%
Currency distribution of Norwegian Covered 
bonds
NOK EUR USD CHF Other currencies
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More regulations lead to more exposure towards regulatory arbitrage. When Basel II was 
introduced it led to several capital requirements to the different types of assets, hence leading 
to the creation of Special Purposed Vehicle (SPV).  The Basel II framework required the banks 
to hold capital better aligned with the risk profile of their portfolios. This meant that the banks 
were required to hold more capital the higher the risk of their loans were. By transferring the 
loans to the SPV the banks got rid of the high risk loans. Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) stated 
that the better quality assets will be sold (securitized) while the low quality assets will be 
funded by deposits under asymmetric information and without government intervention. The 
introduction of Basel II proved them right.  
This is different from the Norwegian way of securitize mortgages. Instead of securitize the 
mortgages with the highest risk, Norwegian banks securitize the mortgages with the lowest 
risk, hence getting a better credit rating, making the funding cheaper. 
 This argues that banks issue covered bonds / Asset-backed securities to obtain liquidity. By 
doing this, they transform illiquid or liquid assets into liquid instruments.  ABS is then used 
to arbitrage the capital requirements of the banks. At end they securitize to change the risk 
profile of their portfolio and to transfer risk and/or arbitrage requirements (Martín-Oliver and 
Saurina, 2007). 
As regulatory arbitrage has a tight bond to regulation, there will always be regulatory arbitrage.  
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8. Future of senior unsecured bonds and covered 
bonds 
There are several regulatory and political factors that could affect the future of senior 
unsecured bonds and covered bonds. In this section we will briefly go through these factors 
and how it might affect the supply and demand of them. 
The first factor is the regulatory changes that were introduced in Basel three. The introduction 
of the liquidity coverage ratio (𝐿𝐶𝑅 =
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 
≥ 100% ) would 
require a bank to hold a set of high quality assets in their liquidity portfolio.  The Norwegian 
authorities have indicated that covered bonds with an AAA and AA rating would have high 
weights in the LCR ratio. This would increase the banks demand for covered bonds. This 
indicates that the banks own holdings of covered bonds will rise in the future. 
Another regulatory factor is the regulatory framework for insurance companies called 
Solvency II. This is a proposed regulatory framework that regulates an insurance company’s 
portfolio. Covered bonds with an AAA and AA rating achieve a very low risk weight under 
the latest proposal. It gives the insurance companies an ability to hold larger amounts of bank 
debt. 
These specifics in these two regulations are just propositions yet, and we don’t know how the 
final result will be. However, a lot of factors are indicating that regulatory requirements will 
create a larger demand for covered bonds in the future. 
The Norwegian Financial Authority (FSA) has commented on some new risks arising due to 
the increased use of covered bonds; how an increased use of covered bonds have increased 
credit growth towards households and how this exposes the banks in the case for a drop in real 
estate prices.  
In order to protect the senior bondholders and depositors, several countries have determined 
that the value of outstanding covered bonds must not exceed a certain percent of the issuer's 
total assets. The FSA is discussing the possibility of imposing Norwegian banks a qualitative 
standard, assessing each credit institution for themselves. The FSA will then monitor banks' 
own assessments of the risks associated with the transfer of mortgages through assessment of 
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risk, risk management and capitalization. We believe this will further increase the demand for 
covered bonds. 
As we earlier discussed, a final resolution of a bank bankruptcy will play an important part in 
the future of both covered bonds and senior unsecured bonds. The market participants are most 
likely waiting for this resolution to determine how senior unsecured bonds are treated in the 
case of a bankruptcy. 
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9. Conclusion 
Covered bonds were initially introduced primarily to ensure Norwegian banks a higher level 
of diversification of assets and lower funding cost. In our study we find this becoming a reality: 
Funding has become cheaper and mortgages has become a new investment product in the 
shape of covered bonds. 
Banks are using the mortgages as both as an investment product by buying others banks 
covered bonds and by financing themselves, hence making banks clearly exposed to the 
housing market. This has led to the backdrop of our thesis: how are the senior bondholders 
affected and how do they react to this change of risk? Our findings indicates a higher exposure 
towards the business market as corporate loans are a bigger part of the banks' assets than 
before. Since the corporate loans are seen as riskier than household loans, the senior 
bondholders should demand a higher return than they did before the exposure. 
By examining senior credit spreads we find that the spread has increased, indicating a response 
to the change of risk. In order to understand which factors influencing the spread, we find that 
return of equity (ROE) and level of encumbrance are the two significant factors predicting the 
credit spread. We have found no evidence that size has an impact on the credit spread. 
The demand for Norwegian covered bonds has been high. We have found different causes 
behind this. The covered bonds have attracted a special sort of investors looking for a safe 
investment. The credit agencies have played a big role in this, because by deciding the rating 
they have attracted the institutional investors. 
Covered bonds are undoubtedly here to stay. As banks will continue to increase their 
encumbrance, more will be required of the bank depositors and the covered bond owners as 
part of their elevated risk. Authorities such as the Norwegian FSA will surely find ways to 
apprehend this, either by a qualitative or a quantitative standard. 
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10. Appendix 
10.1 Datasheet based on the annual reports 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
All numbers in bnNOK
DNB
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Assets (Parent incl loans to CBC) 1105,13 1249,63 1638,21 1616,00 1637,64 1884,95 2013,41
Total Assets (Parent Bank) 1067,31 1164,32 1476,21 1435,28 1472,08 1615,17 1736,79
Liabilities and equity
Market financing (parent + loans to CBC) 326,81 371,78 614,18 500,91 509,45 713,27 640,28
Market financing (parent) 324,18 335,77 507,68 342,76 398,23 384,47 415,00
Senior financing ratio in % of parent bank
Deposits in parent 510,75 510,75 570,31 580,91 624,59 750,10 819,95
Deposit ratio % in parent bank
Assets
Total lending to customers (group) 838,02 980,24 1206,84 1114,89 1170,34 1291,66 1308,86 Note 7
Total lending to customers (parent) 722,88 763,47 824,22 626,81 669,45 711,97 713,74 Note 7
Commercial lending (parent) 363,48 441,41 582,53 481,50 534,73 594,23 583,25 Note 7
Note 7
Household lending (Group) 417,59 456,07 498,85 531,76 559,06 599,94 647,59 Note 7
Household lending (parent) 359,40 322,06 241,69 145,31 134,72 117,73 130,49 Note 7
Loans transferred to CBC 22,95 90,01 198,48 337,11 397,64 463,62 519,36
Liquidity portfolio (Parent) - Certificates and bonds at market price 137,30 82,06 112,27 280,42 304,95 244,34 241,73 Balance
Liquidity portfolio ratio % in parent 0,13 0,07 0,08 0,20 0,21 0,15 0,14
Key numbers to our task
% - Encumberd assets (lending in CBC/ Total assets group) 0,021 0,072 0,121 0,209 0,243 0,246 0,258
Corp lending/Household lending in parent bank 1,011 1,371 2,410 3,314 3,969 5,047 4,470
Commercial lending as % in parent bank (corp lending/total assets parent) 0,341 0,379 0,395 0,335 0,363 0,368 0,336
% of total Household lending transfered to CBC 0,055 0,197 0,398 0,634 0,711 0,773 0,802
Return on equity (ROE) 18,2 % 19,7 % 14,0 % 10,0 % 13,9 % 13,5 % 11,3 %
Capital ratio (parent) 10,2 % 10,5 % 9,9 % 11,4 % 11,7 % 11,5 % 12,4 % Note 4
SPV
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Assets (Parent incl loans to CBC) 60,23 75,05 94,89 97,66 105,28 115,99 127,83
Total Assets (Parent Bank) 60,17 75,01 95,02 96,91 96,96 93,58 96,95
Liabilities and equity
Market financing (parent + loans to CBC) 21,06 27,14 34,25 29,73 37,06 44,61 50,75
Market financing (parent) 21,06 27,14 27,14 28,40 26,38 19,81 21,40
Senior financing ratio in % of parent bank
Deposits in parent 31,12 37,66 41,00 44,97 48,80 53,22 60,14
Deposit ratio % in parent bank
Assets
Total lending to customers (group) 53,45 64,68 76,24 82,30 88,47 99,30 106,79
Total lending to customers (parent) 53,59 64,95 68,37 70,72 66,96 68,42 67,90
Commercial lending (parent) 11,41 14,86 21,16 22,27 23,46 28,21 28,05 Note 10
Household lending (Group) 42,12 50,08 55,27 60,21 64,90 73,06 79,11 Note 10
Household lending (parent) 42,05 50,08 47,20 48,45 43,50 42,45 40,16 Note 10
Loans transferred to CBC 0 0 8,135 11,89 21,727 31,10147 39,168994 Note 39
Liquidity portfolio (Parent) - Certificates and bonds at market price 2,81 5,11 12,76 21,07 21,08 11,54 15,15
Liquidity portfolio ratio % in parent 0,047 0,068 0,134 0,217 0,217 0,123 0,156
Key numbers to our task
% - Encumberd assets (lending in CBC/ Total assets group) 0,000 0,000 0,086 0,122 0,206 0,268 0,306
Corp lending/Household lending in parent bank 0,271 0,297 0,448 0,460 0,539 0,665 0,699
Commercial lending as % in parent bank (corp lending/total assets parent) 0,190 0,198 0,223 0,230 0,242 0,301 0,289
% of total Household lending transfered to CBC 0,000 0,000 0,147 0,197 0,335 0,426 0,495
Return on equity (ROE) 17,9 % 16,2 % 4,9 % 8,0 % 11,3 % 8,7 % 12,3 %
Capital Adequacy 10,2 % 9,7 % 9,1 % 11,8 % 11,6 % 11,6 % 12,6 %
Rating
SR Bank
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Assets (Parent incl loans to CBC) 84,574 107,521 137,15 148,517 159,332 174,5 188,387
Total Assets (Parent Bank) 84,277 102,531 124,92 123,76 133,47 129,81 140,17
Liabilities and equity
Market financing (parent + loans to CBC)
Market financing (parent) 26,057 35,635 45,66 37,52 40,31 36,34 40,69
Senior financing ratio in % of parent bank
Deposits in parent 43,143 50,995 54,94 54,51 60,94 64,21 67,76
Deposit ratio % in parent bank
Assets
Total lending to customers (group)
Total lending to customers (parent) 74,43 84,44 94,64 88,30 100,07 95,28 102,86 Note 8
Commercial lending (parent) 28,84 37,00 48,10 47,06 48,74 52,56 55,72 Note 8
Household lending (Group) 48,86 56,09 63,75 70,60 82,35 91,24 99,65 Note 8/Note 100
Household lending (parent) 48,152 50,429 50,67 43,66 44,89 46,55 51,43 Note 8
Loans transferred to CBC 0,297 4,99 12,23 24,76 25,86 44,69 48,22 Note 8
Liquidity portfolio (Parent) - Certificates and bonds at market price 3,526 5,406 9,09 22,56 18,74 19,86 18,67
Liquidity portfolio ratio % in parent
Key numbers to our task
% - Encumberd assets (lending in CBC/ Total assets group) 0,004 0,046 0,089 0,167 0,162 0,256 0,256
Corp lending/Household lending in parent bank 0,599 0,734 0,949 1,078 1,086 1,129 1,083
Commercial lending as % in parent bank (corp lending/total assets parent) 0,342 0,361 0,385 0,380 0,365 0,405 0,398
% of total Household lending transfered to CBC 0,006 0,089 0,192 0,351 0,314 0,490 0,484
Return on equity (ROE) 23,10 % 19,40 % 8,00 % 17,50 % 15,50 % 11,20 % 12,40 %
Tier two Capital (TC2) 10,56 % 9,77 % 9,80 % 11,86 % 12,41 % 11,44 % 13,10 %
SMN
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Assets (Parent incl loans to CBC) 62,87 73,71 90,95 98,74 114,20 121,82 136,29
Total Assets (Parent Bank) 62,87 70,98 83,65 83,09 96,39 99,70 106,94
Liabilities and equity
Market financing (parent + loans to CBC)
Market financing (parent) 21,91 23,95 28,77 23,36 27,94 28,15 30,26
Senior financing ratio in % of parent bank
Deposits in parent 30,18 32,62 35,39 37,38 43,03 48,11 53,19
Deposit ratio % in parent bank
Assets
Total lending to customers (group+ loans to CBC) 52,82 61,91 71,32 77,43 87,67 95,23 104,29
Total lending to customers (parent) 52,82 59,18 64,02 61,78 69,85 73,11 74,94
Commercial lending (parent) 18,92 23,04 28,64 32,27 38,05 40,20 42,32
Household lending (Group) 29,03 38,87 42,68 45,16 49,62 55,03 62,59
Household lending (parent) 33,78 38,87 35,07 29,12 31,19 34,86 34,43
Loans transferred to CBC 0,00 2,73 7,30 15,65 17,82 22,13 29,35
Liquidity portfolio (Parent) - Certificates and bonds at market price 5,13 5,05 8,49 14,75 17,04 12,92 17,16
Liquidity portfolio ratio % in parent
Key numbers to our task
% - Encumberd assets (lending in CBC/ Total assets group) 0,000 0,037 0,080 0,158 0,156 0,182 0,215
Corp lending/Household lending in parent bank 0,560 0,593 0,817 1,108 1,220 1,153 1,229
Commercial lending as % in parent bank (corp lending/total assets parent) 0,301 0,325 0,342 0,388 0,395 0,403 0,396
% of total Household lending transfered to CBC 0,000 0,070 0,171 0,347 0,359 0,402 0,469
Return on equity (ROE) 23,70 % 18,90 % 11,90 % 16,20 % 14,60 % 12,80 % 11,70 %
Tier two Capital (TC2) 11,90 % 12,10 % 11,90 % 13,60 % 13,00 % 12,00 % 13,30 %
Rating
SNN
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Assets (Parent incl loans to CBC) 54,579 62,407 69,726 74,07 81,729 86,073 95,131
Total Assets (Parent Bank) 54,579 60,168 64,539 63,189 67,441 69,681 73,768
Liabilities and equity
Market financing (parent + loans to CBC)
Market financing (parent) 18,741 19,665 19,746 14,162 14,477 13,342 16,534
Senior financing ratio in % of parent bank
Deposits in parent 27,874 32,053 34,599 34,892 39,352 41,748 41,182
Deposit ratio % in parent bank
Assets
Total lending to customers (group+ loans to CBC)
Total lending to customers (parent) 45,384 48,945 49,491 46,431 46,726 48,749 51,139
Commercial lending (parent) 15,195 17,589 18,265 17,41 17,945 19,128 21,749
Household lending (Group) 30,189 33,595 36,413 39,902 43,069 45,844 50,753
Household lending (parent) 30,189 31,356 31,226 29,021 28,781 29,452 29,39
Loans transferred to CBC 0 2,239 5,187 10,881 14,288 16,392 21,363
Liquidity portfolio (Parent) - Certificates and bonds at market price 4,804 4,856 6,749 8,891 11,541 11,229 12,442
Liquidity portfolio ratio % in parent
Key numbers to our task
% - Encumberd assets (lending in CBC/ Total assets group) 0,000 0,036 0,074 0,147 0,175 0,190 0,225
Corp lending/Household lending in parent bank 0,503 0,561 0,585 0,600 0,624 0,649 0,740
Commercial lending as % in parent bank (corp lending/total assets parent) 0,278 0,292 0,283 0,276 0,266 0,275 0,295
% of total Household lending transfered to CBC 0,000 0,067 0,142 0,273 0,332 0,358 0,421
Return on equity (ROE) 22,9 % 18,1 % 8,1 % 18,2 % 15,3 % 8,5 % 9,0 %
Tier two Capital (TC2) Parent 10,4 % 10,0 % 10,6 % 14,3 % 10,9 % 11,6 % 12,1 %
Rating
SpareBank 1 Hedmark
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Assets (Parent incl loans to CBC) 35,665 38,009 43,664 45,733 49,183 52,702 56,278
Total Assets (Parent Bank) 35,665 38,009 41,764 41,169 41,332 42,842 43,642
Liabilities and equity
Market financing (parent + loans to CBC)
Market financing (parent) 8,641 8,944 9,232 7,487 7,43 7,598 8,038
Senior financing ratio in % of parent bank
Deposits in parent 18,987 21,024 22,484 23,187 24,208 26,042 28,168
Deposit ratio % in parent bank
Assets
Total lending to customers (group+ loans to CBC) 30,22 31,405 34,664 38,796 41,793 44,646 48,091
Total lending to customers (parent) 30,22 31,405 32,764 34,232 33,942 34,786 35,455
Commercial lending (parent) 9,046 9,457 11,129 11,423 12,094 12,326 12,724
Household lending (Group incl CBC) 20,109 21,948 23,535 25,328 27,324 29,35 31,701
Household lending (parent) 20,109 21,948 21,635 20,764 19,473 19,49 19,065
Loans transferred to CBC 0 0 1,9 4,564 7,851 9,86 12,636
Liquidity portfolio (Parent) - Certificates and bonds at market price 2,941 2,665 3,009 4,18 4,531 5,234 5,104
Liquidity portfolio ratio % in parent
Key numbers to our task
% - Encumberd assets (lending in CBC/ Total assets group) 0,000 0,000 0,044 0,100 0,160 0,187 0,225
Corp lending/Household lending in parent bank 0,450 0,431 0,514 0,550 0,621 0,632 0,667
Commercial lending as % in parent bank (corp lending/total assets parent) 0,254 0,249 0,266 0,277 0,293 0,288 0,292
% of total Household lending transfered to CBC 0,000 0,000 0,081 0,180 0,287 0,336 0,399
Return on equity (ROE) 13,10 % 14,20 % 9,80 % 8,00 % 15,50 % 9,80 % 9,20 %
Tier two Capital (TC2) Parent 10,43 % 13,92 % 14,10 % 15,10 % 14,80 % 15,20 % 16,90 %
Rating
Totals
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Assets (Parent incl loans to CBC) 1403,05 1606,32 2074,59 2080,72 2147,36 2436,03 2617,32
Total Assets (Parent Bank) 1364,87 1511,02 1886,11 1843,40 1907,68 2050,77 2198,26
Liabilities and equity
Market financing (parent + loans to CBC) 347,87 398,93 648,43 530,64 546,51 757,88 691,03
Market financing (parent) 420,59 451,11 638,23 453,69 514,77 489,71 531,92
Senior financing ratio in % of parent bank 0,00
Deposits in parent 662,05 685,09 758,72 775,86 840,92 983,44 1070,38
Deposit ratio % in parent bank 0,00
Assets
Total lending to customers (group+ loans to CBC) 974,51 1138,24 1389,06 1313,41 1388,26 1530,84 1568,04
Total lending to customers (parent) 979,32 1052,38 1133,50 928,27 987,00 1032,31 1046,04
Commercial lending (parent) 446,88 543,35 709,83 611,93 675,02 746,66 743,82
0,00
Household lending (Group) 587,91 656,65 720,51 772,96 826,32 894,47 971,38
Household lending (parent) 533,68 514,74 427,50 316,32 302,55 290,54 304,97
Loans transferred to CBC 23,25 99,97 233,23 404,85 485,18 587,79 670,09
0,00
Liquidity portfolio (Parent) - Certificates and bonds at market price 156,51 105,15 152,37 351,87 377,87 305,12 310,26
Liquidity portfolio ratio % in parent 0,18 0,14 0,21 0,41 0,42 0,27 0,30
Key numbers to our task
% - Encumberd assets (lending in CBC/ Total assets group) 0,017 0,062 0,112 0,195 0,226 0,241 0,256
Corp lending/Household lending in parent bank 0,837 1,056 1,660 1,935 2,231 2,570 2,439
Commercial lending as % in parent bank (corp lending/total assets parent) 0,327 0,360 0,376 0,332 0,354 0,364 0,338
% of total Household lending transfered to CBC 0,040 0,152 0,324 0,524 0,587 0,657 0,690
Return on equity (ROE), snitt 19,8 % 17,8 % 9,5 % 13,0 % 14,4 % 10,8 % 11,0 %
Kapitaldekning, snitt 10,6 % 11,0 % 10,9 % 13,0 % 12,4 % 12,2 % 13,4 %  
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